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ESSAY
Terrorist Speech on Social Media
Alexander Tsesis*
The presence of terrorist speech on the internet tests the limits of the
First Amendment. Widely available cyber terrorist sermons, instructional
videos, blogs, and interactive websites raise complex expressive concerns. On
the one hand, statements that support nefarious and even violent movements
are constitutionally protected against totalitarian-like repressions of civil
liberties. The Supreme Court has erected a bulwark of associational and
communicative protections to curtail government from stifling debate through
overbroad regulations. On the other hand, the protection of free speech has
never been an absolute bar against the regulation of low value expressions,
such as calls to violence and destruction.
Terrorist advocacy on the internet raises special problems because it
contains elements of political declaration and self-expression, which are
typically protected by the First Amendment. However, terrorist organizations
couple these legitimate forms of communication with instigation, recruitment,
and indoctrination. Incitement readily available on social media is sometimes
immediate or, more often, calibrated to influence and rationalize future
dangerous behaviors. This is the first Essay to analyze all the Supreme
Court's free speech doctrines that are relevant to the enactment of a
constitutionally justifiable anti-terrorism statute. Such a law must grant the
federal government authority to restrict dangerous terrorist messages on the
internet, while preserving core First Amendment liberties. Legislators should
develop policies and judges should formulate holdings on the bases of the
imminent threat of harm, true threats, and material support doctrines. These
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three frameworks provide the government with the necessary constitutional
latitude to prosecute dangerous terrorist speech that is disseminated over
social media and, thereby, to secure public safety, without encroaching on
speakers' right to free expression.
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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment is often understood in the context of
individuals expressing views about democracy, partaking in debates,
engaging in self-expressive conversations, creating artistic works, and
contributing to discussions.' That broadly theoretical framework is
historically derived from the Framers' arguments against taxation
without representation and the establishment of deliberative
government.2 The broad conception of speech also contemporaneously
informs pressing debates about police cameras,3 internet blogs,4
1. Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1018-42.
2. 1 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 176, 193 (1984)
(discussing protestations against British taxation through the slogan of "no taxation without
representation").
3. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[We conclude there was
insufficient case law establishing a right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop to put a
reasonably competent officer on 'fair notice' that seizing a camera or arresting an individual for
videotaping police during the stop would violate the First Amendment.").
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corporate financing of political campaigns,5 and protests near abortion
clinics.6
Support for terrorism on the internet and legislative efforts to
shut it down pose challenges to traditional political speech doctrines
because they raise conflicting liberty and security concerns.
Supporters of terrorism communicate to advance violent political
ideologies, which are typically protected by the First Amendment, but
also sometimes incite, threaten, and conspire to commit violence,
which are expressions that enjoy no such constitutional protection.
Arguably the most pressing question in the free speech area
today is whether and to what extent terrorist speech is protected by
the First Amendment. One of the most intriguing policy questions
concerns terrorists' uses of the internet as an instrument of
indoctrination and recruitment. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
cogently stated the importance of enacting a U.S. internet anti-
terrorist statute, imploring that "[iut would be extremely helpful to
other countries if the United States could find a solution to its limited
ability to furnish judicial cooperation concerning foreign incitement
offenses resulting from its jurisprudence concerning freedom of speech
and expression."7 This Essay develops a framework for passing such a
law without offending the principles of free speech doctrine.
The matter is not straightforward, however. Under ordinary
circumstances, the First Amendment protects offensive and obnoxious
speech; therefore, even membership in violent and autocratic
organizations is privileged against adverse state actions, except in
very specific circumstances, such as when it advocates imminently
dangerous activities.8 However, recruitment, indoctrination, and
training create more difficult problems for First Amendment theory,
particularly when these communicative activities are done in
coordination with terrorist organizations. The First Amendment
dilemma arises because classic doctrines prohibit the state from
repressing offensive expressions but permit restrictions on incitement.
4. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a student's blog post
was actionable because it "foreseeably create[d] a risk of substantial disruption within the school
environment").
5. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 347 (2010) ("[T]he First Amendment does not
allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker's corporate identity.").
6. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535, 2537 (2014) (holding certain
restrictions on speech at an abortion clinic to be overly broad); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 734-35 (2000) (upholding a picketing restriction in the vicinity of abortion clinics).
7. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, DIGEST OF TERRORIST CASES 118 (2010).
8. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam) (finding that even
violent-sounding statements that are uttered without the immediate threat of their being carried
out are protected by the First Amendment).
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Terrorist communications on the internet often contain both elements,
challenging the scope and applicability of traditional incitement
jurisprudence.
The troubling nature of this subject is brought home by
concrete examples of terrorist recruitment. Numerous terrorists-such
as Omar Mateen, whose attack of the Pulse nightclub in Miami left
forty-nine dead and fifty-three injured-were at least partly
radicalized through materials circulated on the internet.9 The broad
reach of the internet has made it easier than ever to establish terrorist
contacts; groups that were formerly so geographically dispersed that
communications between them were either impractical or impossible
now have the means to collaborate, share membership lists, recruit
new members, and advise each other. This Essay considers the extent
to which terrorist speech can be combatted without running afoul of
free speech norms in the United States. I argue that the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment is not a bar against the limitation of
intentionally inciting, truly threatening, and coordinated terrorist
advocacy. Part I sets out the proliferating problem of terrorist digital
content on social media. Part II turns to U.S. free speech doctrine and
offers preliminary thoughts about the types of terror communications
that might be curtailed without running afoul of the First
Amendment. Part III provides international context by analyzing
treaties and conventions as well as a variety of anti-terror statutes
from foreign democracies. Part IV suggests how best to advance
legislation for combatting terrorist incitement, threats, and material
support. Part V concludes with a critique of scholars who regard
efforts to restrict terrorist advocacy on the internet to be
unconstitutional.
I. INCITEMENT TO TERRORISM ON THE INTERNET
The internet is awash with calls for terrorism. Besides violent
rhetoric, there are forums seeking recruits and even children's
websites to entice young disciples. Addressing the internet's global
reach is one of the greatest challenges regulators face in fashioning
narrowly tailored policies that preserve political expression, while
casting a net to ensnare terrorist incitement before it turns into
violent action. Over the last decade, the internet has become the
mainstage for terrorist incitements. The World Wide Web has
9. Ed Pilkington, FBI and Obama Confirm Omar Mateen Was Radicalized on the Internet,
GUARDIAN (June 14, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/13/pulse-nightclub-
attack-shooter-radicalized-internet-orlando [https://perma.cc/45F7-R6HA].
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revolutionized communications.10 It is a neutral medium. On the one
hand, the internet is an important launching pad for human rights
efforts;" on the other, the internet has developed into an
indispensable medium for terrorist planning, organization, and
incitement.12 Before addressing the constitutional issues of regulating
terrorist incitement and propaganda, this Part surveys the many uses
to which terrorists put the internet.
Technically adept terrorist organizations and their devotees
exploit social networking sites to spread ideologies, disseminate
instructional videos, consolidate power, and threaten enemies.
Terrorist organizations, which are ideologically committed to using
tactical violence to achieve political objectives, use both publicly
available and encrypted channels to organize, plan, and foment
singular and mass acts of terror.13 This Essay deals only with the
regulation of publicly available sources. Terrorists use these tools for
recruitment, propaganda, fund raising, indoctrination, data mining,
and for sharing strategies for attacking and destroying targets.14 For
example, ISIS has multiple Twitter accounts for the rapid
dissemination of propaganda.15 Some national security analysts
predict that terrorist organizations will one day use Twitter to send
real-time messages to coordinate ongoing attacks.16 Twitter is already
an active forum for a variety of terror organizations-groups such as
al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Minbar al-Tawhid wal-Jihad-each
manipulating the internet to its own purposes.17 YouTube is likewise a
hub for radical videos available for viewing throughout the world.18
Facebook too is a source for hate propaganda; although, the company
has a policy against violent threats being posted, civil rights
10. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 201 (2006).
11. Internet Freedom: Promoting Human Rights in the Digital Age--a Panel Discussion,
U.S. STATE DEP'T (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/162490.htm
[https://perma.cc/AY23-4W5E].
12. Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec., 111th Cong. 12 (2010) (statement of Bruce Hoffman).
13. See U.N. COUNTER-TERRORISM IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE, COUNTERING THE USE
OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES-LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS 31-32 (May 2011),
http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitfinteragency.wgcompendium_1egal-technical-asp
ectsweb.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6U9-RCWV].
14. Id. at 32.
15. J.M. Berger, The Evolution of Terrorist Propaganda: The Paris Attack and Social
Media, BROOKINGS (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/01/27-
terrorist-propaganda-social-media-berger [https://perma.cc/X9P2-VQDB].
16. GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERRORISM IN CYBERSPACE: THE NEXT GENERATION 139 (2015).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 141-46.
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organizations who report the violative content have sometimes found
Facebook staff to be intransigent.19 Terrorists have utilized a variety
of other social media to threaten, enlist, defame, and call for brutal
actions.
To give some idea of the incendiary content, Facebook has
refused requests from various watchdog organizations to follow its
written community decency standard to "remove graphic images when
they are shared . .. to celebrate or glorify violence."20 In the past,
despite repeated external requests, Facebook has refused to take down
a community page called, "Stab Israelis."2 1 It depicted a Palestinian
flag in the background and an image of a man menacingly holding a
large knife in his hand.22 On a different Facebook page, a graphically
depicted young man walks down the street with a long butcher knife
in one hand toward two Jews in Chasidic clothes, who are standing at
a bus stop.2 3 Another Facebook page contained a victim's photograph
with a knife blade almost completely imbedded in his head and the
following message: "Stabbing operation. The free men of Al-Aqsa. The
Intifada has started. The [West] Bank is carrying out resistance.
There is nothing greater than a knife penetrating the heads of the
Jews."2 4 This came during a period of terrorist stabbings in Israel. At
the same time Twitter hosted a slew of messages with hashtags
rejoicing and supporting the attacks.25 In response, in 2015, twenty
thousand Israelis filed a class action law suit against Facebook for
"allowing Palestinian terrorists to incite violent attacks against Israeli
citizens on its internet platform."26 The Fatah Facebook page depicted
19. Complaint at 1-2, Lakin v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12831/15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2015)
(filing suit for Facebook's alleged facilitation of terrorist and hate speech).
20. Violence and Graphic Content, FACEBOOK (2016), https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards# [https://perma.cc/AB9P-WVJH].
21. Yitzhak Benhorin, 20,000 Israelis Sue Facebook, YNETNEWS.COM (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4716980,00.html [https://perma.cc/4VHW-BXWC].
Facebook at first refused to take down the "Stab Israelis" page and only did so after an Israeli
newspaper published an article about it. JNS.Org, Facebook Removes 'Stab Israelis' Page
Following Article in Hebrew Press, ALGEMEINER (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.algemeiner.com/
2015/10/14/facebook-removes-stab-israelis-page-following-article-in-hebrew-press/ [https://perma
.cc/EXM9-P9CYJ.
22. Adva Cohen, Class Action Against Facebook Seeks to 'Dislike' Incitement,
YNETNEWS.COM (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4711718,00.html
[https://perma.ccRBU8-VT6T].
23. Social Media as a Platform for Palestinian Incitement-Praise for Stabbing Attackers,





26. Benhorin, supra note 21 (providing the first page of the complaint).
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Al-Aqsa mosque atop a rising mound of dirt with rats trying to climb
up and infiltrate it, all of the rodents with Jewish stars on their
backs.27 Yet a different Facebook page is dedicated to purported
Jewish ritual murder of Christian children,28 a group defamation that
has often incited violence against Jews.
The effect of this contact can best be gathered from information
gleaned about the social media influence on domestic terrorists. The
path to Tashfeen Malik and Syed Farook's terrorist attacks in San
Bernardino readily exemplifies how incitement is spread on the
internet and later acted upon by devotees. The shooters, a husband
and wife, listened to hours of terror imam Anwar al-Awlaki's lectures
and "por[ed] over directions on making explosives" in Inspire, the al-
Qaeda magazine created by al-Awlaki and Samir Kahn.29 Al-Awlaki's
lectures are easily available through a basic search on YouTube;
indeed, a search under his name yields more than 69,900 results. His
inciteful lectures have been repeatedly connected to persons who
perpetrated terrorist attacks, including the Charlie Hebdo shooting,
the Boston Marathon bombing, the assassination attempt on MP
Stephen Timms, and others.30 Without adequate government
initiative, civil rights activists have found it difficult to convince these
websites to take down online terrorist support.31 To be fair, some
internet service providers have made an earnest effort at combatting
terrorism on their websites,32 but the elusive nature of terror
organizations and the commercial interests intrinsic to corporate-
mindedness requires adequate government oversight to add elements
of punishment and deterrence in cases of recalcitrance.
Terrorist incitement is not new, but social networks have
vastly increased the span of its influence. Prior to the broad
27. Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Recent Examples of Palestinian Incitement to Terror
(Nov. 18, 2014), http://mfa.gov.iliMFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Examples-of-
Palestinian-incitement-to-terror-18-Nov-2014.aspx [https://perma.cc/TU9A-JMPD].
28. Jewish Ritual Murder, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/truthaboutjews (last
visited Jan. 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/KRL6-3CMU].
29. Scott Shane, Internet Firms Urged to Limit Work of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/us/politics/internet-firms-urged-to-limit-work-of-
anwar-al-awlaki.html [https://perma.cc/4774-M3J3].
30. Woman Jailed for Life for Attack on MP Stephen Timms, BBC (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-11682732 [https://perma.cc/8V4H-FV76].
31. See Shane, supra note 29.
32. One of the recent positive efforts by internet service providers had been the creation of
a joint database-shared by Twitter, Microsoft, Facebook, and YouTube-that created "'hashes'
(unique digital 'fingerprints') for violent terrorist imagery or terrorist recruitment videos or
images that have been removed from their services." Partnering to Help Curb Spread of Online




availability of the internet, terrorist operatives and recruits faced far
greater hurdles to meeting and coordinating attacks. With the
exponential growth of the internet in the last two decades,
communications between terrorist organizations and their operatives
have been fundamentally transformed.33 For example, individuals can
upload videos, articles, and emails from internet cafes, home
computers, or portable devices that can later be accessed anywhere in
the world.34  Furthermore, networks, editors, disseminators,
promoters, and services empower persons to pass the information onto
new cyber forums.35
The internet poses legal puzzles for pluralistic countries.36 The
World Wide Web provides terrorist organizations with a host of ways
to disseminate inciting messages through social media, real time chat
rooms, text messages, Twitter accounts, and a host of email
applications. The cross-border nature of cyber communications has
far-reaching consequences at great distances from the country where
the messages were sent. Those messages can impact persons across
borders through electromagnetic transmissions, creating potential
international conflicts. Materials might be downloaded in one country
but stored on servers abroad.
The internet has empowered terrorists' recruitment and
publicity efforts. Unlike old media sources such as newspapers,
terrorist organizations now control the production, direction, editing,
and dissemination of their messages to worldwide audiences.37
Moreover, the internet emboldens terrorists by providing them with
the tools to post anonymously and inexpensively.3 8 Terrorists spend a
significant amount of resources and time on their web presentations.3 9
Their leaders are deeply aware of the importance communications
33. See HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 197-202 (discussing terrorist organizations' reliance on
computers, CDs, emails, and web services).
34. See, e.g., Barbara Mantel, Terrorism and the Internet: Should Web Sites that Promote
Terrorism Be Shut Down?, 3 C.Q. GLOBAL RESEARCHER, Nov. 2009, at 285, 287.
35. See Transcript of Record at 886, U.S. v. Ali Hamza Suliman al Bahlul (Military
Comm'n Convening Order No. 07-01, 07-05), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/O/pdfs/alBahlul/Bahlul
%20Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KQM-2XZE].
36. See Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a
Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 521-31 (2009).
37. See HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 197 (asserting that "the art of terrorist communication
has evolved to a point at which the terrorists themselves can now control the entire production
process").
38. Id. at 201-02.
39. Mantel, supra note 34, at 285-89.
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play in terrorizing populations, indoctrinating recruits, consolidating
power, and spreading propaganda.40
Interactive forums on Twitter, Facebook, Google+, and Tumblr
host discussions, membership drives, threats, and calls to arms of
terrorist organizations such as ISIS.41 Among the messages readily
available on these sites are advocacy of mobilization, calls for people to
travel to the Levant and join in the fight, coverage of life in the
caliphate, and warnings to those unwilling to join in the ideological
and religious mission.42 ISIS's accounts also provide information about
newly formed networks to use in case law enforcement agents begin to
monitor existing ones or social media sites remove some accounts.43
ISIS is not an isolated example, as many other organizations that the
U.S. State Department has designated as terrorists have made similar
use of the new media. Among these, the Continuity Irish Republican
Army makes regular use of the internet to disseminate and propagate
their political goals and violent tactics as well as to establish support
networks.44 Similarly, Hamas regularly uses chat rooms to plan and
organize its activities; exploits emails to coordinate between
operatives in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebannon; publishes
instructions for creating bombs, toxic gases, and poisons; and operates
children's sites containing photos of youths wearing military regalia
and carrying weapons, features on "martyrs" who killed Jews, and
catchy phrases calling for martyrs to be covered in blood.45 A
significant number of other terror organizations have websites,
including Boko Haram, Hezbollah, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and many others.46 While
40. The awareness of the impact of new media is evident in a letter Ayman al-Zawahiri,
who is currently the leader of al-Qaeda, wrote to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of al-Qaeda
in Iraq, to stress the importance of communications: "We are in a battle, and more than half of
this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media." Gordon Corera, Traditional Media:
Impact on Proterrorism Propaganda and Counterterrorism Policies, in COMBATING
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 123 (Steve Tsang ed., 2009).
41. LORENZO VIDINO & SEAMUS HUGHES, ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM RETWEETS TO RAQQA 21
(2015).
42. Id. at 23.
43. Id. at 24.
44. See Lorraine Bowman-Grieve, Irish Republicanism and the Internet: Support for New
Wave Dissidents, 4 PERSP. ON TERRORISM, May 2010, at 22.
45. John Arquilla et al., Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism, in IAN 0.
LESSER ET AL., COUNTERING THE NEW TERRORISM 65 (1999); see STEVEN EMERSON, JIHAD
INCORPORATED: A GUIDE TO MILITANT ISLAM IN THE US 478 (2006); Gabriel Weimann,
www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, U.S. INST. PEACE 9 (Mar. 13, 2004),
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/srl16.pdf [https://perma.cclV5K3-8TXA].
46. Paul Piper, Terrorist Activity on the Internet, INFO. TODAY, INC. (Dec. 2008), http://www




the actual number of terrorist sites is constantly in flux, some idea of
magnitude may be gleaned from the Canadian Centre of Intelligence
and Security Studies's finding that in 2006 there were about five
thousand operational terrorist websites.47
Among the most recent examples of how terrorist websites
influence and indoctrinate followers were the cases of Dzhokhar and
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who set off bombs at the April 15, 2013, Boston
Marathon.48 A variety of clues provided investigators with information
about the criminal motivation behind the attack.49 Investigators also
sought to determine whether the brothers were acting under the
direction of a larger terrorist organization.50 A search of surviving
brother Dzhokhar's computer revealed several radical tracts by a
renowned terrorist preacher with a broad internet following, Anwar
al-Awlaki. 51 The same al-Awlaki had provided email counsel to Major
Nidal Hasan before the latter went on a terrorist shooting rampage in
Fort Hood, Texas.52 After the murders, al-Awlaki bragged that Hasan
was his student and defended the murder spree as "a heroic act" and
"a wonderful operation."53 In the same interview, which first ran on an
al-Qaeda sponsored website, al-Awlaki went on to exhort others to
commit acts of violence:
I support what he did, and I call upon anyone who calls himself a Muslim, and serves in
the U.S. Army, to follow in the footsteps of Nidal Hasan. Good deeds erase bad ones. In
47. Lorenzo Vidino et al., Terrorist Chatter: Understanding What Terrorists Talk About 19
(Norman Paterson Sch. of Int'l Affairs, Carleton Univ., Working Paper No. 03, 2015).
48. Dianatha Parker & Jess Bidgood, Boston Marathon Bombing: What We Know, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/usfboston-marathon-bombings-trial-
what-you-need-to-know.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2NU7-4ZHA].
49. When the younger brother was captured he had used his own blood to write messages
clearly indicating the motivation behind his actions. Those messages included: "The U.S.
Government is killing our innocent civilians"; "Can't stand to see such evil go unpunished"; "We
Muslims are one body, you hurt one you hurt us all"; "Stop killing our innocent people and we
will stop." Michael Scherer, 5 New Revelations from the Boston Bomber Indictment, TIME (June
27, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/06/27/5-new-revelations-from-the-boston-bomber-
indictment/ [https://perma.cc/5JDQ-A4HF].
50. Richard A. Serrano et al., Boston Suspect Says No Outside Role in Blasts, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2013, at Al.
51. Peter Bergen & David Sterman, The Man Who Inspired the Boston Bombings, CNN
(Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/11/opinion/bergen-boston-bombing-awlaki-jihadists/
[https://perma.cc/U6LQ-94B9].
52. Lessons from Fort Hood: Improving Our Ability to Connect the Dots: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations & Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong.
11-12 (2012) (statement of Douglas E. Winter, Deputy Chair, The William H. Webster
Commission on the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the
Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009), http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland
.house.gov/files/Testimony-Winter.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ8C-C86B].
53. Jacob Sullum, Commentary, With Terrorists, Obama's 'Trust Me' Is Not Enough, CHI.
SUN TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, at 34.
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addition, I call upon [all] Muslims to follow in his footsteps, and to wage Jihad by speech
or by action.54
Until his death in a U.S. drone strike, al-Awlaki was a
powerful voice on the internet terrorist community with his own
Facebook page, blog, and cadre of followers.56 He was an example of
how a charismatic leader can effectively exploit social media to recruit
and threaten. His website openly supported violent conflict, religious
bigotry, and violent advocacy through speeches, articles, and
publications, such as his 44 Ways to Support Jihad.56 A variety of
terrorists openly spoke of his influence on their plots. For example, his
work inspired three of five men who planned to attack Fort Dix, New
Jersey; a group of eighteen men who planned to blow up the Toronto
Stock Exchange listened to al-Awlaki sermons and were influenced by
his text, Constants on the Path of Jihad; and, the men who carried out
the July 7, 2005, terror attack in London were mesmerized by al-
Awlaki's exaltation of shaheeds (martyrs).57
Calls for YouTube to voluntarily take down al-Awlaki's videos
have achieved limited success.58 Pressure on the company mounted
after an investigation of Roshonara Choudhry, who attempted to
assassinate a member of the British Parliament.59 Police discovered
that Choudhry had downloaded "the full set of Awlaki's lectures" and
had become radicalized through his sermons.60 After the attempted
assassination, British Minister of State for Security and Counter
54. Yemeni-American Jihadi Cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki in First Interview with Al-Qaeda
Media Calls on Muslim U.S. Servicemen to Kill Fellow Soldiers and Says: "My Message to the
Muslims ... Is that We Should Participate in this Jihad Against America . . .," MEMRI (May 23,
2010), http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4202.htm [https://perma.cc/M85U-A6PZ].
55. Anwar Al-Awlaki's Messages Still Resonate on Facebook, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE:
EXTREMISM & TERRORISM (Feb. 6, 2014), http://blog.adl.org/extremism/generation-awlaki-
facebook-terrorism-messages-still-resonate [https://perma.cc/2TW3-HJDU].
56. Katherine Zimmerman, Militant Islam's Global Preacher: The Radicalizing Effect of
Sheikh Anwar al Awlaki, AEI CRITICAL THREATS (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.criticalthreats.org/
yemen/militant-islams-global-preacher-radicalizing-effect-sheikh-anwar-al-awlaki [https://perma
.cc/9HTW-6HQ5].
57. Steve Swann, A Truly Dangerous Meeting of the Minds, BBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32065132 [https://perma.cclWH8P-EEWT]; Zimmerman,
supra note 56.
58. See James Gordon Meek & Kenneth R. Bazinet, YouTube's Got to Gag Mouthpiece:
Weiner, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/youtube-
gag-jihad-mouthpiece-anwar-al-awlaki-rep-anthony-weiner-article- 1.187619 [https://perma.cc/
KJA3-KHJY].
59. John F. Burns & Miguel Helft, YouTube Withdraws Cleric's Videos, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/world/04britain.html [https://perma.cc/YPW6-8BHN].
60. Vikram Dodd, Roshonara Choudhry: I Wanted To Die ... I Wanted To Be a Martyr,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/04/stephen-timms-attack-
roshonara-choudhry [https://perma.cc/MRK7-9FKC]. Choudhry confessed to have listened to
more than "100 hours" of al-Awlaki's sermons. Id.
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Terrorism, Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, requested of the United
States to eliminate and block al-Awlaki's videos from servers hosted in
the United States. The videos, as Neville-Jones asserted, "incite cold-
blooded murder" and would "categorically not be allowed in the U.K." 61
While the United States rejected the request, YouTube voluntarily
took down several of the videos found to be in violation of its Terms of
Service.62 But, rather than completing the removal, YouTube has
continued to allow a large collection of al-Awlaki videos to be
searchable, viewable, and audible on its website. The availability of al-
Awlaki's ideologically driven sermons and threats of violence are
representative of a large trend that remains unaddressed by U.S. law.
The next part of this Essay surveys relevant First Amendment
doctrines that must be the starting point for a U.S. law prohibiting
incitement, true threats, and material support of terror on social
media.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND TERRORIST SPEECH
Free speech is a quintessential constitutional right because it is
essential to politics, research, and self-assertion. The First
Amendment establishes a substantive injunction against
indiscriminate government regulation of speech. At its philosophical
core, the Free Speech Clause protects each individual's right to
participate in deliberative democracy, express ideas, engage in
politics, and generally contribute to the common good of open society.63
As a general rule, courts regard limits on speech with suspicion unless
such regulations are narrowly defined within the context of American
precedential history.6 4
The Supreme Court has developed a variety of helpful
doctrines for lower courts to distinguish abstract statements in
support of terror and those that intentionally intimidate or are likely
to cause imminent threats of harm. Moreover, there is no First
Amendment right to cooperate with a terrorist organization in
advancing its political agenda; however, government cannot impair
61. Burns & Helft, supra note 59 ("Pauline Neville-Jones, a former high-ranking diplomat
who is security minister in the Cameron government, said of the videos that Britain would 'take
them down' if it was purely a British issue, but that the implications were 'global' and required
action by the United States.").
62. Id.
63. See Tsesis, supra note 1, at 1042-43 (expostulating the role of the common good in free
speech theory).
64. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) ("The First Amendment's guarantee
of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits.").
662 [Vol. 70:2:651
TERRORIST SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA
the right to be a peaceful member of an organization or even to
advocate its nefarious purposes.
The core distinction here is in the free speech value of advocacy
as opposed to the unprotected, albeit communicative, contribution to
the perpetration of violence. Identifying doctrines for distinguishing
between these modes of communication is essential to avoid repeating
grave errors of an era in the early- to mid-twentieth century, when the
Supreme Court countenanced the suppression of subversive but
nonviolent speech.65 At the heart of the Red Scare, which has left such
an indelible imprint on the heightened scrutiny of U.S. free speech
jurisprudence,66 was the McCarthy Era witch hunt of innocent persons
associated with the Communist movement and even those suspected
of being engaged in it.67
The difference between agitating for change, even when
expressed obnoxiously or favoring anti-democratic institutions, and
inciting violence can be ascertained by examining Dennis v. United
States, where the Court upheld the convictions of U.S. Communist
Party leaders for allegedly "knowingly and willfully" engaging in
advocacy "intended to overthrow the Government of the United States
as speedily as the circumstances would permit."68 In hindsight, while
the evidence against the defendants in Dennis was remarkably
weak-consisting of the presumption that they supported violent
overthrow of sovereignty because of their commitment to Marxist-
Leninist ideology69-recognition of the government's authority to
prohibit purposeful instigation for violent overthrow has not faltered.
The premise in Dennis discredits an earlier decision in Whitney
v. California, where a defendant's conviction had been based solely on
her membership in the Communist Party, with no indication she
planned to incite others to revolutionary violence.70 Hence the Court
eventually overturned Whitney and probably should have overturned
the convictions of the defendants in Dennis, or at least more closely
scrutinized statutory application to the defendants. Nevertheless, the
65. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment
Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 845.
66. See, e.g., Jason Paul Saccuzzo, Bankrupting the First Amendment: Using Tort
Litigation to Silence Hate Groups, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 408 (2001) (discussing the Warren
Court's liberal reaction to the First Amendment jurisprudence of the Red Scare period).
67. See Richard Delgado, Are Hate-Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Reply to Steven
Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 874 (1998).
68. 341 U.S. 494, 515, 516 (1951).
69. Id. at 497-98; United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 374-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)
(containing grand jury indictment).
70. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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State need not sit idly by "until the putsch is about to be executed."71
Justice Brandeis, in his concurrence to Whitney, provided a crucial
caveat that there is a "wide difference between advocacy and
incitement."72 The Supreme Court itself has recognized the distinction
between these two cases in Brandenburg v. Ohio, explaining that
advocacy can only be prohibited when it is "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."73 In later years, as we will see in this Part of the Essay,
the Court further qualified free speech doctrine to not protect true
threats and material support to terrorists.
The First Amendment right to engage like-minded people, to
express one's views, and to disseminate information, even in
statements supportive of violent political action, does not extend to
conduct that advances violent terrorist activities.74 That balance
between speech and the social interest in security is predicated on
nuanced judicial frameworks, requiring careful analysis of how to
rigorously protect deliberative democracy while prohibiting narrow
categories of destructive messages incompatible with public safety.
In this Part of the Essay, I aim to identify First Amendment
jurisprudence that offers viable legislative approaches for restricting
terrorist incitement or propaganda. It first parses the incitement
doctrine, then turns to true threats, and concludes with the material
support for terror. This discussion of Supreme Court jurisprudence
provides the groundwork for Part IV's elaboration on the scope of a
constitutionally sound statutory initiative for curtailing dangerous
terrorist speech on the internet.
71. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509. Researchers have found that the Court's pronouncement in
Dennis "led to the arrest and prosecution of dozens of additional CPUSA [Communist Party of
the United States] members." Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American
Constitutionalism Survive Victory?, 41 OHiO N.U. L. REV. 261, 273 (2015). In the current
categorical rules era of First Amendment jurisprudence, it is unlikely that Dennis's balancing
test would withstand constitutional muster. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Democracy,
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1458 n.149 (2004). While it is Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in
Dennis that is typically referred to as balancing congressional and speech interests, see Dennis,
341 U.S. at 524-26, 542-46 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), the plurality likewise used a version of
that method. Id. at 510 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 215
(2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.) (adopting the "gravity of the evil" test for identifying whether the
existing danger justified government imposed restrictions on speech)).
72. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
73. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
74. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Terrorism and Associations, 63 EMORY L.J. 581, 617-18 (2014)
(defining the peaceful right of association).
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A. Incitement Doctrine
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes first announced the clear and
present danger test for incitement in Schenck v. United States.75 The
case upheld convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917 against two
defendants who had distributed leaflets urging readers to refuse
conscription into the military.76 That World War I era statute
criminalized "willfully mak[ing] or convey[ing] false reports or false
statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the
military or naval forces of the United States or . .. promot[ing] the
success of its enemies."77 In his majority opinion, Justice Holmes set
out a seminal adjudicative test: "The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."78
This test recognizes the federal government's authority to ensure
public safety, especially "[w]hen [the] nation is at war."79
With time, the test for incitement and Holmes's thinking on it
became refined to distinguish it from merely offensive
communications. In his dissent to Abrams v. United States, which
became one of the most influential statements of First Amendment
norms, he wrote eloquently against suppressing the free expression of
innocuous political opinions, even those that were averse to
government policies.80 In that case, the majority upheld the
convictions of five anarchists for writing and publishing a pamphlet in
opposition to the United States' intervention in the Soviet Civil War
between the White Armies and the Bolsheviks.81 Those five were
sentenced to jail, despite making general political statements without
threatening anyone. Holmes, in dissent, wrote that the expression of
controversial speech should not be restricted unless it posed "the
present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about."82
Rather than seeking to suppress offensive ideas, Holmes
75. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
76. Id. at 47-53.
77. Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
78. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). Justice Holmes elaborated that the "clear
and present danger" question is one of "proximity and degree." Id.
79. Id.
80. 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. See Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From
the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 845 (2008)
(explaining the anarchist defendants' political protest).
82. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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remonstrated, "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market."83
Holmes's principled statement establishes that the First
Amendment safeguards the expression of views, even those
challenging government operations. Likewise, persons can associate
with anti-governmental groups. However, as Justice Brandeis pointed
out in a concurrence to a separate case, "[A]though the rights of free
speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature
absolute" but can be restrained when a conspiracy or incitement poses
a clear and present danger of "destruction or ... serious injury,
political, economic or moral."84 However, as we saw in Part I, much of
terrorist communications on the internet are not simple exchanges of
ideas but indoctrinations intended to recruit listeners to commit
violent offenses.
Fifty years after deciding Schenck, the Supreme Court
established the current standard for incitement in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.85 The Court held the First Amendment protects "advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action."8 6 For clarification, the Court added that "the
mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral.
necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action."87
Scholars have written of Brandenburg in its broader context
but are often silent about the limitation of its applicability. For
instance, Professor Geoffrey Stone praises the case as a bulwark built
"to withstand the undue pressure to stifle dissent in wartime."8
Professor Nadine Strossen likewise reads the case broadly as a
general prohibition against statutes that punish "generalized
advocacy" that "was neither intended nor likely to cause immediate
violent or unlawful conduct."89 As a general matter, both of these
statements are correct; however, neither author adequately accounts
83. Id. at 630.
84. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
85. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); see Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech:
Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1145, 1159 (2013). While the First Amendment
protects debate just as much during peace as it does during periods of war, the persistent uses of
the internet by terrorist organizations increases government's interest in placing adequate limits
on its dissemination.
86. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
87. Id. (quoting Noto v. United States, 378 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
88. Geoffrey R. Stone, War Fever, 69 MO. L. REV. 1131, 1151 (2004).
89. Nadine Strossen, Incitement o Hatred: Should There Be a Limit?, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243,
251 (2001).
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for the context of the facts under which the case arose. Brandenburg
was decided in a very particular circumstance: The only people
present at the rally were Ku Klux Klan members and a camera crew,
whom the Klan invited. Participants did not intend to intimidate the
outsiders nor did anyone direct any fighting words at them.90 As the
Klan's guests, the reporter and cameraman had nothing to fear. Given
the speculative nature of the violent threats (for example, "it's possible
that there might have to be some revengeance taken")91 it is no wonder
that the Court overturned Brandenburg's conviction for the State's
lack of proof that the comment was an intentional threat or that the
rally posed any imminent threat of harm. Under different
circumstances, where a fight is likely to imminently break out or
specific threats are issued, the judicial analysis will be quite different.
The incitement doctrine applies only to imminently dangerous
statements and is hence of limited value to combat internet terrorist
incitement. A statute containing such a component could be effective
against immediate calls for violence through applications such as
Instagram or Snapchat. But the bulk of internet terrorist speech seeks
long-term indoctrination, mentoring, recruitment, and so on; hence,
policymakers need additional doctrinal guidelines.
B. True Threats
The diffuse nature of the World Wide Web and the typical lack
of immediacy of the posts limit the applicability of the Brandenburg
incitement standard to terrorist content on the internet. The true
threats doctrine, which does not contain an imminence component,92
applies to larger sets of online terrorist postings than was envisioned
in the 1960s, when Brandenburg was decided. This Section contains a
discussion of the three true threats cases most relevant to
90. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445-46:
The record shows that a man, identified at trial as the appellant, telephoned an
announcer-reporter on the staff of a Cincinnati television station and invited him to
come to a Ku Klux Klan "rally" to be held at a farm in Hamilton County. With the
cooperation of the organizers, the reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting
and filmed the events.
91. Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
92. See United States v. Dillard, 795 F.3d 1191, 1200 (10th Cir. 2015) ("Imminence may
contribute to a finding that a communication constitutes a true threat, but it is not a required
element."); United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (asserting that true




adjudication and policy construction: Watts v. United States,93 Virginia
v. Black,94 and Elonis v. United States.95
Watts, which was decided the same year as Brandenburg,
contains the building blocks for the "true threats" category of
unprotected speech.96 The case arose from a speech that Watts made
at an anti-Vietnam War rally. "If they ever make me carry a rifle," he
had asserted, "the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J."97 The
defendant was subsequently convicted for knowingly and willfully
threatening the president.98 Unlike the defendant in Brandenburg,
Watts made his statements in a very public, political forum. Upon
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding the
statement was not a true threat but protected "political hyperbole."99
As the Court recognized, the language of politics is often "vituperative,
abusive, and inexact."100 Although the defendant's statements were
"crudely offensive," he was not criminally liable because in the context
of the anti-war rally his statements could not be construed as
threatening.101
The Watts holding left ambiguity that led to a lower court split
as to whether the prosecution needed to prove up that a speaker
reasonably foresaw the words' effects on the audience or that a
reasonable recipient would understand the statements to be
threatening.102 The Court's most recent definition of the constitutional
standard adopted neither of those diverging readings: it held, in
Virginia v. Black, that the prosecution at a criminal trial is required to
93. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
94. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
95. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
96. Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-08.
97. Id. at 706 (referring to then President Lyndon Baines Johnson).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 707-08.
100. Id. at 708.
101. Id.
102. See Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining
how the Ninth and Second Circuits' interpretative standards on true threats differed); see also
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d
1058, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on an objective test, not containing an immediacy element,
about "whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by
those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm
or assault" (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)));
United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) (interpreting Watts as a recognition
of true threats only in circumstances of "unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific"
personal threats).
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prove the intent of the defendant charged with making true threats.103
There is no need to demonstrate whether a reasonable person would
have understood the statements to be intimidating nor to provide
evidence of audience response, but only the intent to threaten.104 The
Court defined true threats to be: "Those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals."1 05 This type of expression is reflective of many forms of
terrorist speech on the internet, which we saw in Part I often takes
the form of intentional intimidation, motivation, recruitment, and
training of others.06
The Court's most recent true threats case, Elonis v. United
States, focused on statutory interpretation but did not seem to alter
the constitutional standard in Black.07 Elonis overturned the
conviction of a defendant charged under a federal law that
criminalized interstate and international threatening
communications.08 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts
rejected the interpretation of those circuit courts that had previously
found the prosecution needed only to prove that a reasonable person
would foresee his words to be threatening to the audience.09 While the
103. 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) ("'True threats' encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.").
104. Id. at 359-60 ("The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.").
105. Id. at 359.
106. See ANTHONY RICHARDS, CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM 104 (2015); CATHERINE A.
THEOHARY & JOHN ROLLIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41674, TERRORIST USE OF THE INTERNET:
INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE 3 (2011).
107. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015); id. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("It is settled that the Constitution does not protect true
threats.").
108. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2016).
109. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012:
In light of the foregoing, Elonis's conviction cannot stand. The jury was instructed
that the Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard Elonis's
communications as threats, and that was error. Federal criminal liability generally
does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant's
mental state;
see also United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 510-11 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that Black did not
create a "specific-intent-to-threaten requirement" for cases involving true threats); United States
v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 333 (8th Cir. 2011) ("The government need not prove that Mabie had a
subjective intent to intimidate or threaten in order to establish that his communications
constituted true threats."). But see United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 953, 960-61 (9th Cir.
2007) (finding that the true threats statute requires proof of specific intent to threaten).
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statute had no explicit mens rea provision, the Court found that
"wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal."110
The Chief Justice did not revisit Black's definition of true
threats."' Dicta from Justice Alito's separate opinion in Elonis,
nevertheless, may supply additional clarity into the doctrine's
meaning. He intimated that true threats are unprotected by the First
Amendment because they "inflict great harm and have little if any
social value."112 This statement conceives true threats to be low value
expressions that have traditionally and historically been unprotected
by the First Amendment.113 True threats are not only dangerous
because they may incite others to violent confrontation, but also that
they "may cause serious emotional stress for the person
threatened."1 14 Moreover, Justice Alito asserted that, although the
threatening statement may be made in a communication containing
other nonthreatening words, this does not require the State to excuse
the threatening part of the message.115
The true threats doctrine along with the incitement doctrine
reviewed in Part II.B provide two pieces of the constitutional puzzle
lawmakers will need to put together in constructing a statute
prohibiting terrorist threats on social media. It is suited for
prosecuting the intentional expression of threats against individuals
or groups via social media. Yet, where the terrorist communication is
neither immanently dangerous nor intentionally threatening, an
additional doctrine fills out the range of initiatives that Congress can
pursue.
C. Material Support for Terrorism
As with the true threats doctrine, mens rea is a required
element for finding a party culpable under the material support for
terrorism statute. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute
prohibiting anyone from providing "material support or resources" to
organizations that the Secretary of State has designated to be foreign
110. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252
(1952)).
111. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003).
112. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012).
114. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Id.
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terrorists.116 The statute contained a mental component, applying only
to anyone who lent support with the "knowledge of the foreign group's
designation as a terrorist organization or the group's commission of
terrorist acts."117
Several U.S. nonprofit organizations, including Humanitarian
Law Project, brought facial First Amendment challenges to the statute
because it criminalized providing "communications equipment" and
"expert advice or assistance" to the designated terrorist organizations.
Plaintiff sought to provide training in international law, political
involvement, and negotiation strategies to the Kurdish Workers' Party
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, both groups on the State
Department's designated terrorist organization list. Humanitarian
Law Project's conduct certainly posed no immediate danger and
therefore was protected under Brandenburg, and the organization had
made no threats and therefore differed from the intentional threat of
Black. Instead, the Court determined that the federal government had
authority to prohibit groups from working with terrorist organizations
even when their violent operations were interlinked with more benign
functions, such as charity work.118
The statute's prohibition against counseling terrorists in the
use of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge1 9 raised
concerns about content-based discrimination. The law clearly
distinguished between persons disseminating technical and
specialized information about negotiations to terrorist organizations
and communicating the same to benign entities or parties. Indeed, the
statute reached only material support that was coordinated or
directed by a foreign terrorist organization, but not independent
propaganda on behalf of the group.120 The matter at bar was,
therefore, different than content-based discrimination of simply
obnoxious or disfavored communications.12 1
116. 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010). The formal title of the statute at bar is Providing Material
Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)
(2006).
117. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 12.
118. See id. at 29 (deferring to Congress's finding that foreign terrorist organization are so
thoroughly saturated with criminal activities that any contributions to them will advance their
illegal schemes).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) (2006).
120. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 31-32; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h).
121. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 789, 805 (2011) (striking down a
state statute prohibiting the sale or rental to minors of violent video games "patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the community"); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011) (holding
that the First Amendment protects speech even when some audience members find it hurtful
and obnoxious); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 574
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Under ordinary circumstances, the Court reviews content-
based restrictions through the prism of strict scrutiny analysis,
examining whether the government has a compelling interest for
enforcing the restriction and whether it is narrowly tailored to the
policy aim.122 Indeed, some commentators immediately asserted that
the Court decided Humanitarian Law Project on the basis of strict
scrutiny analysis.123 The dissent, however, recognized this not to be
the case, even criticizing the majority for not demanding the
government to prove up the matter under this most rigorous
constitutional standard.124 Presumably because of the grave danger
involving terrorist organizations, the Court was more deferential than
it might have been under ordinary circumstances. The majority was
only willing to identify its analysis to be "more rigorous scrutiny" than
the intermediate scrutiny test, unfortunately not providing any
clearer alternative standard of review.125 In what appears to be a
lawyerly sleight of hand maneuver, in his later opinion to William-
Yulee, Chief Justice Roberts reworked the Humanitarian Law Project
standard of review and in passing cited the case as an example of a
strict scrutiny case.126
(1995) ("[T]he point of all speech protection ... is to shield just those choices of content that in
someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.").
122. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015) ("A law that is content based on
its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral
justification, or lack of 'animus toward the ideas contained' in the regulated speech."); Williams-
Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (relying on strict scrutiny analysis to uphold a
content-based limitation on judicial candidate speech).
123. Eugene Volokh, for instance, asserts that Humanitarian Law Project is the "only non-
overruled majority opinion upholding a content-based speech restriction under strict scrutiny."
Eugene Volokh, Humanitarian Law Project and Strict Scrutiny, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21,
2010, 1:28 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/humanitarian-law-project-and-strict-scrutiny
[https://perma.cc/H9ML-BYS5].
124. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]here, as here, a
statute applies criminal penalties and at least arguably does so on the basis of content-based
distinctions, I should think we would scrutinize the statute and justifications 'strictly'-to
determine whether the prohibition is justified by a 'compelling' need that cannot be 'less
restrictively' accommodated.").
125. Id. at 28 (majority opinion).
126. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1665-66 ("The Florida Bar faces a demanding task in
defending Canon 7C(1) against Yulee's First Amendment challenge. We have emphasized that 'it
is the rare case' in which a State demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest. But those cases do arise." (citing Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U.S. at 25-39; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 314 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992))).
This was not the first time the Chief modified a holding in a string cite, without explanation
or analysis. In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, Roberts cited to a 1977 case,
National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977), for the proposition that the
First Amendment protects "Nazi parades." 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). That claim, however,
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Indeed, it is likely that the outcome of the case would have
been the same even if the Court engaged in strict scrutiny review
because the government was pursuing one of its core, compelling
functions, defined by the Preamble to the Constitution, to provide for
the nation's common defense.127 It would have seemed logical,
therefore, for the Court to find that prohibiting individuals and groups
from advancing the causes of terrorists is compelling. Furthermore,
the majority in Humanitarian Law Project found that in this case
criminal liability was attached to "a narrow category of speech to,
under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups that the
speaker knows to be terrorist organizations."128
Under ordinary circumstances communication with a group,
especially about political topics such as participation in international
forums, would be protected free speech. This would even be the case if
the subject of the conversation were to be the abstract praise or even
support for revolution, overthrow, or violence. Indeed, the Court noted
that the statute did not prohibit "independent advocacy," defense, or
espousal of ideology, but only knowingly proving support.129 However,
context matters, as it did under the different circumstances in
grossly distorted the holding in National Socialist Party of America, which ordered a remand of a
case on the purely procedural grounds that judicial review of lower court injunctions implicating
the First Amendment could not be delayed, but must provide for "immediate appellate review."
432 U.S. at 43-44.
The Chief Justice in fact appears to be a master of distorting past holdings to meet the
contingency of his ideological conclusions, acting more like an advocate than judge. Another
poignant example of his skill appears in recent voting rights cases: his presentation of state
equality in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder relied on an
earlier voting rights decision, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966), for the
proposition that the doctrine of state "equal sovereignty" has precedential basis. Northwest
Austin, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009). But the quote in Northwest Austin from Katzenbach Roberts
introduced-"Distinctions can be justified in some cases. 'The doctrine of the equality of
States . . . does not bar . .. remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.'
Katzenbach"-skillfully used an ellipsis to obfuscate a key portion of the statement in
Katzenbach, which limited the concept of equal state sovereignty to admission to the Union. 383
U.S. at 328-29 ("The doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar
this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the
Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared."). Later, in
Shelby County, the Chief actually quoted the entire passage from Katzenbach, (including those
parts he excluded in Northwest Austin), but not letting the limiting language ("applies only to the
terms upon which States are admitted to the Union") stop his internal drive to create a firm
foundation for equal state sovereignty, he actually cited his own distortion in Northwest Austin
for "the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty." Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624
(2013). About the Chiefs sleight of hand, Justice Ginsburg remarked, "[T]he Court ratchets up
what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing breadth to the equal sovereignty
principle in flat contradiction of Katzenbach." Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 40.
128. Id. at 26.
129. Id. at 16, 23.
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Brandenburg, and when those statements are made in concert with an
organization or individual committed to political violence, content that
is protected in other circumstances can be regulated to protect the
public from terrorism. In the case of the material support statute,
however, government interest is not the suppression of some political
message. Rather, it is to impede terrorist organizations from using the
power of propaganda to advance violent wings of the organization.1 3 0
The Court accepted the government's argument that the "fungible"
nature of resources Humanitarian Law Project sought to provide
terrorists would help them gain "legitimacy" in international forums,
empower their recruitment efforts, and help "raise funds."131
Therefore, the majority in Humanitarian Law Project found that
terrorist organizations typically lack the "firewalls" to prevent
material support from sympathetic charitable organizations from
being funneled into their maleficent activities.132
Given that the government has no means of exploring the
financial or organizational records of all foreign terrorist
organizations, a complete ban on material support is a narrowly
tailored means of providing for national security. In Humanitarian
Law Project, the majority should have been more systematic in
explaining whether or the extent to which the government's
fundamental responsibility for national security did not require as
close a tailoring as might have been expected in ordinary content
restriction cases involving no similarly grave constitutional charge.133
The closest the Court came to explaining that deference was to
mention that the Preamble to the Constitution establishes national
security to be a foremost national obligation.13 4 Therefore, the
government could have argued that it has a proportionately
compelling reason to enforce a limited restriction on individuals from
teaching terrorist organizations that have not renounced political
violence how to exploit international legal channels and
130. In 2016, litigants filed a federal lawsuit against Facebook for claiming it "knowingly
provided material support and resources to Hamas . .. facilitat(ing) this terrorist group's ability
to communicate, recruit members, plan and carry out attacks, and strike fear in its enemies."
Dan Williams, Relatives of Palestinian Attack Victims Sue Facebook for $1 Billion in U.S.,
REUTERS (July 11, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-facebook-
idUSKCNOZR1GO [https://perma.cc/6PQM-GRTJ].
131. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 30-32.
132. Id. at 30-31.
133. See Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making,
98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 489 (2013) (discussing the greater deference the Court gives to
congressional initiatives in matters of national security).
134. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 40.
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instruments.135 Each incremental aid for terrorists to strengthen their
standing and influence increases the ability of the leadership to
simultaneously carry out destructive missions.136 Moreover, as the
majority recognized, the advice Humanitarian Law Project proposed to
provide terrorists was likely to strengthen their hands at the
negotiation table because "material support of a terrorist group's
lawful activities facilitates the group's ability to attract 'funds,'
'financing,' and 'goods' that will further its terrorist acts."1 3 7
The Court's rationale and ruling in Humanitarian Law Project
provides valuable guidance for drafting a federal criminal statute
against sponsoring, propagandizing, or recruiting in cooperation with
terrorists and their organizations. It indicates why there is a
compelling interest to act against social media postings that seek to
cooperate, legitimate, recruit, coordinate, or indoctrinate on behalf of
groups listed on the State Department's list of designated terrorist
organizations. Part IV develops the framework of such a statute
without offending First Amendment principles. It likewise explains
the compellingly important reasons for restricting imminently
dangerous and directly threatening terrorist speech on social media.
Part V then reflects on several academic criticisms to the use of
material support for terror as a basis of content-based restrictions.
Before turning to those discussions, it is enlightening to gain further
insight from international efforts against hate speech in general and
against destructive messages disseminated over the internet in
particular.
III. INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAWS
AGAINST INCITEMENT AND TERROR
As is the case in the United States, representative democracies
and international entities throughout the world treat freedom of
speech as a fundamental right. At the international level, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1948, proclaimed that "everyone has the
135. Vicki Jackson makes the interesting point that rather than a categorical prohibition
against material support of terrorism, the Court could have provided greater clarity and
justification for its holding in Humanitarian Law Project by relying on proportionality analysis
to identify why narrow tailoring analysis may be altered or modified "in some class of national
security cases." Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3139-40 (2015).
136. See Boim v. Holy Land Fund for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2008).
137. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 32 n.6.
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right to freedom of opinion and expression."1 3 8 Furthermore, since the
adoption of UDHR, freedom of speech provisions have been "included
in all international human rights treaties."139 Unlike the United
States, however, the international community is less tolerant of
terrorist propaganda and less hesitant about criminalizing its
dissemination.140 There is a broad consensus in the international
community-manifested by treaties, conventions, and protocols-that
virulent group defamation has instigated the perpetration of a variety
of crimes against humanity, including the Holocaust and Rwandan
genocide.
The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime has identified various
terrorist propaganda on the internet, including the sharing of
extremist ideas; "recruitment, radicalization, and incitement to
terrorism"; procuring financial support; disseminating
misinformation; and spreading alarm and fear in the population.141
The increasing use of internet technology by international terrorists
has ignited a global debate over the legitimacy of regulating terrorist
incitements. Domestic initiative and international cooperation is
essential to address international terrorism, which is composed of non-
state actors who coordinate, plan, and incite attacks in an effort to
affect the outcomes of politics. Therefore, it is useful to examine how
the international community and foreign countries, especially those
with a strong tradition of protecting free expression, address the
dissemination of terrorism on the internet.
A. United Nations Efforts Against International Incitement
The roots of international efforts against terrorism lie in long-
standing norms against hateful incitement directed at groups. The
enormous scale of the Holocaust and the effectiveness of Nazi
propaganda in recruiting followers to commit crimes against humanity
138. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948)
("Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers."); see ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE
MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR DESTRUCTIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 180-81
(2002); Tsesis, supra note 36, at 501.
139. WIBKE K. TIMMERMANN, INCITEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (2014).
140. See Eric De Brabandere, The Regulation of Incitement to Terrorism in International
Law, in BALANCING LIBERTY AND SECURITY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS PENDULUM 219 (Ludovic
Hennebel & Helene Tigroudja eds., 2011).




TERRORIST SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA
catalyzed early international efforts to address the dangers of
incitement.142 After World War II, the international community
recognized a pressing need to establish collaborative norms for
limiting the dissemination of hatred. The United Nations took the first
step in this process in 1948, when the General Assembly adopted the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. Among the signatories obligations is to punish "[d]irect and
public incitement to commit genocide."143 Two decades later, U.N.
members passed the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"), which recognized incitement to be a threat to
international peace and security.144 Article 20(2) of the ICCPR
requires states to prohibit "incitement to hatred."145 It reads, in
relevant part: "Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
shall be prohibited by law."146 Article 20(2) is read in conjunction with
the protection on free expression located in Article 19(2).147
In addition to the broader conventions against hatred,
genocide, and violence, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1624
specifically calls for signatories to prevent and prohibit terrorist
incitements.148 The collective goal of Resolution 1624, which was
passed in the aftermath of the London terrorist attack of July 7, 2005,
is for states to "adopt such measures as may be necessary and
appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under
international law to . .. [p]rohibit by law incitement to commit a
terrorist act or acts."149 Danish Prime Minister Anders Rasmussen
captured the essence of Resolution 1624: "Freedom of speech and
expression is the very foundation of any modern democratic society,
142. TSESIS, supra note 138, at 180-81.
143. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 3(c), Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
144. De Brabandere, supra note 140, at 221-22.
145. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16,
1966).
146. Id.
147. Id. art. 19:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. (2) Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,. regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice. (3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary ....




but that must never be an excuse for inciting terrorism and fostering
hatred."150 Despite the call upon the international community to
criminalize terrorist incitement, Resolution 1624 lacks a clear
roadmap for country-by-country enactment.
Three years after its adoption, the U.N. Secretary-General
offered a definition for the incitement to terrorism: "Incitement can be
understood as a direct call to engage in terrorism, with the intention
that this will promote terrorism, and in a context in which the call is
directly causally responsible for increasing the actual likelihood of a
terrorist act occurring."151 Several provisions of the resolution call on
member states to prohibit incitement, recruitment, and training of
terrorism, "when committed intentionally" through the use of internet
technology or by other means.152 Like the material support statute in
the United States, Resolution 1624 is drafted to allow for the
criminalization of aiding and abetting terrorists by incitement,
recruitment, and coordination.
B. European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism
While Resolution 1624 was a call for the international
community to enact domestic laws proscribing direct incitement to
terrorism, the Council of Europe took a more practical step to
advancing the Resolution's terms by passing the European Convention
on the Prevention of Terrorism.153 The Council-which represents
forty-seven countries, twenty-eight of them members of the European
Union-seeks to advance human rights through international
conventions. Its initiative to prevent terrorism is part of a cooperative
effort to prosecute the growing incidents of terrorism without
negatively impacting the freedoms of expression and association.154
The Convention includes a provision, Article 5, requiring each member
state to criminalize the "public provocation to commit a terrorist
offence."155 The Convention defines "public provocation" as the
"distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the
150. Quoted in De Brabandere, supra note 140, at 226.
151. U.N. Secretary-General, The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While Countering Terrorism, 1 61, U.N. Doc. A/63/337 (Aug. 28, 2008).
152. Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 Amending
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism, 2008 O.J. (L 330) 8-11.
153. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, COUNCIL EUR. (May 16,
2005), http://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent
?documentId=090000168008371c [https://perma.cc/48F3-GXJR].
154. Id. at pmbl. ("Recognising that this Convention is not intended to affect established
principles relating to freedom of expression and freedom of association.").
155. Id. art. 5.
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public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offense,
where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist
offences, causes a danger that one or more such offenses may be
committed."156 As with the U.S. true threats and material support
doctrines, Article 5 applies only when the speaker has specific intent
and when the utterance is directed at the public.
Where Article 5 differs from U.S. law is in the provision that
prohibits not only direct advocacy but also "indirect incitement,"
including "apologie" for terrorism.15 7 Laws that criminalize the
apologie of terrorism, also known as "glorification of terrorism,"
proscribe speech that publicly praises, supports, or justifies terrorism
or terrorist acts.158 The regulation of apologie to terrorism is
significantly more controversial than traditional incitement
statutes,159 and anything comparable in the United States would
likely be found unconstitutional. On the other hand, Article 5 appears
to be in keeping with precedents of the European Court of Human
Rights.
The broad European understanding of public harm against
which the state can act is reflected in the holding of the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") in the Leroy v. France decision.160 In
Leroy, a French cartoonist published a cartoon on September 13, 2001,
depicting the Twin Towers attack and the caption: "We have all
dreamt of it . . . Hamas did it."161 The cartoonist was convicted and
fined £1,500 for condoning and glorifying terrorism. The European
Court of Human Rights later upheld his conviction because, in
addition to being political commentary about perceived American
imperialism, the cartoon glorified terrorism and attacked the dignity
of its many victims. 1 6 2 Moreover, the ECHR found the drawings were
capable of stirring up violence.163 For a U.S. appellate court o uphold
156. Id.
157. De Brabandere, supra note 140, at 232-34.
158. Id. (citing the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on Terrorism definition of
apologie).
159. For background on the differing methods states have used to combat indirect
incitement, see Daphne Barak-Erez & David Scharia, Freedom of Speech, Support for Terrorism,
and the Challenge of Global Constitutional Law, 2 HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 1, 5-19 (2011).
160. Leroy v. France, App. No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 2, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=002-1888#{"itemid":["002-1888"]} [https://perma.cc/2HLM-592W].
161. Dirk Voorhoof, European Court of Human Rights Case of Leroy v. France, IRIS LEGAL
OBSERVATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL COMMUNITY, IRIS 2009-2:2/1, http://merlin.obs
.coe.int/iris/2009/2/articlel.en.html [https://perma.cc/EXF7-YFF5].
162. Id.
163. Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, Chamber Judgment:




such a conviction, the likelihood of violence would have to be
imminent, of which there was no indication. Moreover, the cartoonist
was neither threatening anyone nor cooperating with a terrorist
organization. Therefore, this parody would have almost certainly been
protected by the First Amendment in the United States.
In a more recent French case, the French comedian Dieudonne
M'Bala M'Bala was arrested for terrorism apologie made after the
attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo.164 Immediately
following the attack, the phrase "Je suis Charlie," meaning "I am
Charlie," became a popular French expression of solidarity with the
victims and the right of self-expression and political affirmation.
Playing on this statement, Dieudonne tweeted, "Je suis Charlie
Coulibaly," translated "I am Charlie Coulibaly."165 The tweet referred
to Amedy Coulibaly, who was one of the four gunmen connected with
the Charlie Hebdo shooting.166 Dieudonne was among fifty-four
persons arrested by French authorities for the apologie of terrorism.167
A Parisian court later convicted Dieudonne for supporting terrorism
on the internet and sentenced him to a two month suspended sentence
for a Facebook post sympathizing with terrorist gunmen.168 As crude
and sympathetic to terrorism as Dieudonne's statements were, it is
highly unlikely that he would have been similarly convicted in the
United States.
C. Democracies' Curbs on Digital Terrorist Propaganda
In an effort to bolster British security following the July 7,
2005, London terror attacks and in keeping with the terms of the
164. Krishnadev Calamur, Controversial French Comedian Arrested over Facebook Post on






168. Aurelien Breeden, Comic Is Guilty in Terror-Speech Case in Paris, INT'L N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2015, at 4. Adding to Dieudonn6's legal troubles, a Belgian court, sitting in the City of
Liege, later convicted him on separate charges for inciting hatred. Henry Samuel, French
Comedian Dieudonnd Sentenced to Two Months in Prison, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 25, 2015, 11:39 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/12015954/French-comedian-
Dieudonn6-sentenced-to-two-months-in-prison.html [https://perma.cc/JNT8-3CCV]. The court
fined him nine thousand euros for a comedy routine in the City in which he expressed doubt that
Jews were killed in gas chambers. Id. In a different case altogether, the European Court of
Human Rights convicted Dieudonnb, reasoning that free speech guarantees do not protect racist
and "anti-Semitic comments." Dan Bilefsky, Court Rules Against French Comedian Dieudonne in
Free-Speech Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/world/europe/
dieudonne-mbala-mbala-france-european-rights-court.html [https://perma.c/46YY-WSYX].
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European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, the United
Kingdom passed the Terrorism Act of 2006.169 The Act criminalizes the
intentional or reckless encouragement of others to commit
terrorism,170 the purposeful distribution of terrorist publications, and
the purposeful provision of service "to others that enables them to
obtain, read, listen to or look at such a publication, or to acquire it by
means of a gift, sale or loan."171
Opponents of the Act have warned that the government may
abuse its power to intrude on privacy. Those concerns, while
authentic, have not been borne out in practice; the United Kingdom
has been very judicious in bringing charges under the law. Despite the
hesitancy of officials, there have been several notable achievements.
In 2011, Mohammed Gul received five years in jail for creating
compilation videos depicting terrorist attacks with extremist
commentary.172 In a 2010 case, an East London student, Roshonara
Choudhry, whose radicalization was influenced by extremist sermons
that she discovered on the internet, was convicted for attempting to
murder a member of Parliament.173 The same year, Shasta Khan
began reading, listening to, and studying radical materials found on
the internet, such as al-Awlaki sermons and articles in the al-Qaeda
magazine Inspire.174 She and her husband were eventually convicted
after they began planning an antisemitic terrorist act, engaging in
reconnaissance missions to Jewish sites, and gathering bomb-making
169. For a summary of the U.K. Terrorism Act 2006, see Tufyal Choudhury, The Terrorism
Act 2006: Discouraging Terrorism, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 463-87 (Ivan Hare &
James Weinstein eds., 2009).
170. Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.).
171. Id. § 2.
172. See Islamic Terrorist Propaganda Student Mohammed Gul Jailed, BBC NEWS (Feb. 25,
2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-12576973 [https://perma.cc/4YPZ-NYQG];
see also Radical Preacher Anjem Choudary Jailed for Five Years, BBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-37284199 [https://perma.cc/AMC3-JASG] (reporting that an imam,
whose "followers carried out attacks in the UK and abroad," was convicted and sentenced to five
years for preaching radical doctrine and posting online a statement of allegiance to ISIS).
173. DAVID ANDERSON, THE TERRORISM ACTS IN 2012: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
REVIEWER ON THE OPERATION OF TERRORISM ACT 2000 AND PART 1 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2006
§ 2.23 (July 2013), https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/
2013/07/Report-on-the-Terrorism-Acts-in-2012-FINALWEB1.pdf [https://perma.cclLP9N-74AY];
Dodd, supra note 60; Vikram Dodd, Roshonara Choudhry: Police Interview Extracts, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 3, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara-choudhry-police-
interview [https://perma.cc/RMA4-X2VF].
174. Shiraz Maher & Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, ICSR Insight-Jihad at Home, ICSR
(July 7, 2012), http://icsr.info/2012/07/icsr-insight-jihad-at-home/ [https://perma.cc/ZX2Q-WJJL];
Oldham Wife Shasta Khan Guilty of Jewish Jihad Plan, BBC NEWS (July 19, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-manchester-18882619 [https://perma.cc/KLP7-9RQS].
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materials.175 In a separate case, three men who promoted terrorism on
the internet were sentenced in 2007 to ten years in prison.176
As Part I of this Essay demonstrated, terrorists have found the
internet to be effective for indoctrination, propagandizing, and
recruitment. The U.K.'s Terrorism Act of 2006 is even more focused in
its terms for combatting these evils than the U.S. material support
statute. Both are national approaches designed to aggressively
address threats that impact public safety.
Additionally, the U.K. Data Retention and Investigatory
Powers Act 2014 requires public telecommunications operators, such
as internet service providers ("ISPs"), to "retain relevant
communications data" that the Secretary of State deems necessary to
investigate allegations of terrorist activities.177 In response to this
statutory requirement, the United Kingdom's major ISPs-BT, Virgin,
Sy, and Talk Talk-now feature a public hyperlink to facilitate the
reporting of terrorist materials online to the Counter Terrorism
Internet Referral Unit.178 Placing conditions on ISPs to monitor the
content of their digital traffic is controversial because it can be abused
to suppress legitimate communications. But the United Kingdom is by
no means alone in this effort.
The French government has taken a similarly cooperative
approach by entering into agreements that require French ISPs to
filter materials containing "child pornography, terrorism, or hate
speech."179 The French Interior minister claimed that ninety percent of
people recruited to terrorism are indoctrinated through internet
content.180 France has recently enlisted the support of Apple,
Facebook, Google, and Twitter to help the government ward off
terrorism.181 The new regulation, which requires ISPs to delist
offending websites from web searches, can lead to rapid responses to
175. Maher & Meleagrou-Hitchens, supra note 174.
176. UK Court Jails Trio Who Incited Terrorism over Web, REUTERS (July 5, 2007),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security-internet-idUSLO485000520070705
[https://perma.cc/AP64-K4KR].
177. Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, c. 27, § 1 (U.K.), amended by
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, ch. 3, § 21 (U.K.).
178. Patrick Wintour, UK ISPs To Introduce Jihadi and Terror Content Reporting Button,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2014, 10:17 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/14/uk-
isps-to-introduce-jihadi-and-terror-content-reporting-button [https://perma.cc/5TRH-3RFA].
179. Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 401 (2009).
180. Fridbric Donck, EU Issues Overview-14-20 February 2015, ISOC EUR. REGIONAL
BUREAU NEWSL. (Internet Soc'y), Feb. 23 2015, at 3.
181. Id.
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truly threatening posts and exchanges.182 The cooperative relationship
between government and private actors is not fully voluntary as ISPs,
telecommunication services, and web-hosting services must cooperate
with French intelligence units.183 Some civil rights groups have raised
understandable concerns about the potential for government
overreaching. An appeals process to an administrative court offers
persons who are opposed to the order an opportunity to challenge
takedown demands, which the French Central Office on the Fight
Against Crime is empowered to enforce.184
In the Netherlands, General Civil Penal Code Article 147c
prohibits anyone from spreading information that encourages others
to commit terrorist actions.185 Another provision of that country's code,
Article 147d, prohibits anyone from providing material support to
terrorist organizations or recruiting anyone to participate in one.186 In
2015, Ishaq Ahmed and another man were indicted under Article 147
for pledging to raise money for ISIS to send to fighters in Syria along
with other equipment, such as clothes and shoes.187 Ministers from
other European democracies-Austria, Germany, Sweden, Denmark,
Italy, Spain, Latvia, Belgium, and Poland-have likewise agreed in
principle to work with social media companies to combat terrorists'
persistent, regular, and effective uses of cyberspace.188
Given the nature of the internet, multi-state cooperation is
most likely to significantly stunt the spread of terrorist ideology.
182. Amar Toor, France Can Now Block Suspected Terrorism Websites Without a Court
Order, VERGE (Feb. 9, 2015, 7:01 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/2/9/8003907/france-
terrorist-child-pornography-website-law-censorship [https://perma.cc/454J-JMB7].
183. Bertrand Liard & Alexis Tandeau, New French Act on Intelligence Services: Impacts on
Technical Operators, WHITE & CASE (Sept. 11, 2015), www.whitecase.com/publications/article/
new-french-act-intelligence-services-impacts-technical-operators [https://perma.cc/AQ6D-NKN7].
184. France Implements Internet Censorship Without Judicial Oversight, EDRI (Mar. 11,
2015), https://edri.org/france-censorship-without-judicial-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/VM58-
LR3Q].
185. Almindelig borgerlig Straffelov 22 mai 1902 §§ 147(a)-162(c). For an English
translation, see The General Civil and Penal Code with Subsequent Amendments, the Latest




187. Two Men Charged Under Norway Anti-terror Law, LOCAL (May 11, 2015, 2:09 PM),
http://www.thelocal.no/2015051 /norway-charges-fourth-man-under-anti-isis-law
[https://perma.cc/4523-ZJ6E]. Article 147a establishes factors for determining the gravity of the
terrorist offence. Almindelig borgerlig Straffelov 21 desember 2005 § 147(a).
188. Sam Trendall, Politicians Across Europe Call on ISP 'Partnerships' To Help Fight




Accordingly, the European Commission created a European Union
Internet Referral Unit on July 1, 2015, for tracking terrorist materials
online.189
In North America, Canada adopted a statute, C-51, which
empowers officials to seize and take down terrorist propaganda after
obtaining a court order.190 The statute passed in June 2015; it is,
therefore, still too early to know whether, as its critics claim, Canada
will exploit the law to abuse police powers. Given the country's
historical commitment to human rights and free speech, it is more
likely that the Canadian judiciary will place limits on investigators
seeking takedown orders to preserve citizens' deliberation and safety.
The real challenge will be applying the law fairly without engaging in
arbitrary content restrictions. But on its face, C-51 concerns only
terrorist propaganda, communications that are outside the realm of
Canadian free speech protections, as are material support and true
threats.
A consensus understanding already exists around the world
about the dangers to public order posed by terrorist uses of the
internet. Many democracies have either adopted or are developing
legislation that permits greater regulation of internet propaganda and
recruitment. The difficulty is the same today as it was a decade ago:
governments must develop policies effectively safeguarding public
well-being while staying true to the European commitment to
preserving online privacy. While the European and Canadian policies
balance speech and privacy differently than the United States'
approach-with Europe tending to be less libertarian and more driven
by privacy concerns than the United States-they share an obligation
to safeguard public safety against terrorism.
IV. DRAFTING A UNITED STATES CYBERSPACE TERRORIST STATUTE
This Part of the Essay sets out an urgently needed statutory
framework for regulating internet-based terrorist incitement,
propaganda, and indoctrination. Self-policing by social networks has
proven only partly adequate for identifying and removing such posts,
particularly without any criteria of what constitutes incitement and
189. Press Release, European Commission, Implementing the European Agenda on
Security-New Measures to Combat Terrorism and Illicit Trafficking of Firearms and Use of
Explosives (Dec. 2, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-15-6219_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/D2GC-FM2J].
190. Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2015, C C-51 (Can.); Laura Payton, Anti-terrorism Powers:
What's in the Legislation?, CBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2015, 1:25 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
anti-terrorism-powers-what-s-in-the-legislation-1.2937964 [https://perma.cc/ZRA7-ANW4].
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where the line is between merely "loathsome" speech and true
threats.19' While companies like Yahoo, Facebook, and Twitter are
able to carefully filter advertising content to their users, they choose
not to eliminate messages of terrorist organizations using their
servers. A national law is needed to prohibit conduct closely tracking
the doctrines set out in Part II: a law regulating terrorist
communication on the internet should prohibit imminently dangerous,
truly threatening, and materially supportive forms of terrorist digital
content. However, even political support of heinous terror speech that
poses no danger, expresses no intentional menace, nor is coordinated
with any designated terrorist organization is protected by First
Amendment norms of deliberation, self-expression, and dissemination
of information.
The need for a law prohibiting terrorist incitement on the
internet is evidenced by the widespread assessment in the national
security community-foremost the views of the Republican Chair,
Richard Burr, and the Democratic Vice Chair, Dianne Feinstein, of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence-that, in addition to existing
surveillance laws, an additional statute should be passed to prevent
terrorist recruitment, distribution of information, and planning
through social media.192 That bill is currently in the re-drafting stage,
and this Essay aims to aid in the write-up process.
We need not solely accept the views of politicians. Part I of this
Essay provided examples of how persons who attempted or
perpetrated acts of terror had earlier been radicalized through
postings they accessed online. For example, one of the two San
Bernardino terrorists, who together murdered fourteen people, had
pledged her support of ISIS on Facebook.193 Organizations like ISIS
191. See Alex Hern, Google's Eric Schmidt Calls for 'Spell-Checkers for Hate and
Harassment,' GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/
dec/08/googles-eric-schmidt-spell-checkers-hate-harassment-terrorism [https://perma.cc/T887-
RSNZ] ("Chairman says everyone should work together to fight terrorism online and to de-
escalate tensions on social media, but does not set out any plans."); Deepa Seetharaman et al.,
Social Websites Hunt for Terror Posts, WALL ST. J. Dec. 7, 2015, at BI (discussing how such
companies must make judgment calls).
192. Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Bill Would Require Tech Companies to
Report Online Terrorist Activity (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
2015/12/bill-would-require-tech-companies-to-report-online-terrorist-activity [https://perma.cc/
HG72-9M6R].
193. For statements in support of the Combat Terrorist Use of Social Media Bill of 2015, see




make consistent uses of social media to shock, threaten, and
communicate ideology.194
Intelligence agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, have identified terrorist groups' "widespread reach
through the internet and social media."19 5 Expert testimony before
congressional committees, such as the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Government Affairs, shows that military
strategy against terrorist groups should coincide with government
efforts to undermine their social media communication campaigns.196
In separate research, Professor Gabriel Weimann has found that
terrorists regularly use platforms like Facebook and Twitter to upload
and download videos, send messages, recruit, instruct, and train. An
example of this nefarious training is the Boston Marathon bombers,
the Tsarnaev brothers, who learned how to design the bomb using Al-
Qaeda's online publication.197
This Essay focuses on the regulation of propaganda to incite
terrorism, the intentional dissemination of serious expressions of
violence directed at particular individuals or groups, and the
solicitation or provision of assistance to designated terrorist
organizations.198 It seeks to resolve the quandary of how to maintain
the First Amendment interest in protecting offensive speech, even
speech that abstractly extolls acts of terror, while drawing up some
narrowly drafted prohibitions. Scholars like Professor Ashutosh
Bhagwat are correct to argue that the First Amendment freedom of
association does not extend to violent terrorist groups; on the other
hand, I think it is mistaken to believe that the Free Speech Clause
does not enable government to prohibit violent political advocacy.199
Speech protection is not absolute, and many speech-protective
194. P.W. Singer & Emerson Brooking, Terror on Twitter, POPULAR SC. (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://www.popsci.com/terror-on-twitter-how-isis-is-taking-war-to-social-media [https://perma.cc/
V3WR-N56V].
195. "Threats to the Homeland" Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation).
196. See Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement
of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies) (discussing
ISIS's use of social media platforms such as Twitter for terrorist recruitment).
197. Gabriel Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace, FATHOM (2015), http://fathomjournal.org/
terrorism-in-cyberspace! [https://perma.cc/JUH5-A5PE].
198. See discussion infra Part IV.
199. See Bhagwat, supra note 74 (arguing that "purely independent" speech in support of
terrorism, without coordination with a terrorist organization, may be protected by the First
Amendment).
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democracies around the world do not shield the dissemination of
terrorist ideologies.200
U.S. politicians on both sides of the aisle have proposed
solutions to address the proliferation of menacing, indoctrinating, and
organizing terrorist posts. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
suggested that social media companies-such as Facebook, Snapchat,
and Twitter-take down terrorist posts and websites.201 But
exclusively voluntary compliance is unlikely to result in rigorous
enough efforts by companies for such sites, which have for years been
forums for terrorism, to eliminate the problem.202 Given the extreme
danger to national security of terrorism, voluntary schemes are
insufficiently robust. While some social media providers (like Twitter)
have made a good beginning by policing their sites,203 these efforts are
predicated on business sensibilities rather than on public policy;
therefore, their lists of terror groups might not be identical to the
State Department's. Furthermore, the First Amendment applies to
government action, not to the private conduct of cyber-businesses, who
might therefore target too much or too little speech without incurring
liability. Criminal penalties, notice requirements, and injunctive relief
are required to combat the quickly growing problem.
At the other end of the political spectrum from Clinton,
President Donald Trump has previously suggested that it might be
appropriate for the government to shut off the internet to specific
geographic locations.204 Trump's initiative would deploy a dragnet that
would sweep up terrorist speech, but it also runs the risk of dredging
200. For example, in the United States, advocacy directed to producing imminent lawless
action, and likely to produce such action, is unprotected incitement. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
201. David E. Sanger, Hillary Clinton Urges Silicon Valley to 'Disrupt' ISIS, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/us/politics/hillary-clinton-islamic-state-saban-
forum.html [https://perma.cc/7TVX-WZH7]. In her December 2015 statement, Hillary Clinton
presented a cooperative plan with social media companies to prevent terrorist recruitment via
"social media, chat rooms, and what's called the 'Dark Web.'" Michael Wilner & Danielle Ziri,
Hillary Clinton Will Target Hamas's 'Virtual Territory,' Campaign Says, JERUSALEM POST (June
13, 2016), http://www.jpost.com/US-Elections/Hillary-Clinton-will-target-Hamass-virtual-
territory-campaign-promises-456589 [https://perma.ec/KK4A-RVA7].
202. Ariel Ben Solomon, Cyber Jihad Expert: Social Media Companies Are Unlikely to Stem
Online Propaganda, JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Cyber-
jihad-expert-Social-media-companies-are-unlikely-to-stem-online-propaganda-436743
[https://perma.cc/TF2L-4SYT].
203. See, e.g., Twitter (@twitter), Combating Violent Extremism, TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2016,
20:13 UTC), https://blog.twitter.com/2016/combating-violent-extremism [https:/perma.cc/5WQ9-
WRSW] (detailing Twitter's efforts to shut down ISIS related websites).
204. Ed Mazza, Donald Trump Wants Bill Gates' Help 'Closing That Internet Up,'




up expressions of politics, arts, and many other forms of
constitutionally protected speech.
Senators Richard Burr (R-N.C.) and Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.),
respectively the Chair and Vice Chair of the U.S. Senate Intelligence
Committee, have introduced an unrefined bill, modeled on child
pornography legislation, that would require social media sites and
similar businesses to turn over information when they "become aware
of terrorist activity such as attack planning, recruitment or
distribution of terrorist material."205 Critics point out, however, that
the bipartisan bill does not define what constitutes "terrorist activity"
and thus mandates that businesses make content-based judgment
calls.
Although the United States' approach to free speech tends to be
more libertarian than Europe's and Canada's,206 the jurisprudence
reviewed in Part II (the imminent incitement, true threats, and
material support doctrines) suggests that a three-pronged approach to
terrorist internet advocacy, recruitment, and agitation can be
formulated in conformity with First Amendment doctrines. I
recommend passage of either an omnibus three-part statute or three
separate statutes criminalizing imminently inciting, truly
threatening, and materially supportive terrorist communications.2 0 7
The law should be drafted in conformity with Supreme Court
precedents and informed by the European experiences and
international initiatives against cyber terrorist posts.
An imminently inciting posting is one that is highly probable to
result in terrorist conduct.208 For example, where a person prods
another on social media-such as Snapchat, WhatsApp, or Facebook
Chat-to begin without delay a politically motivated attack, the
205. Bill Would Require Social Media Companies to Report Terrorist Activity, NBC NEWS
(Dec. 8, 2015, 6:27 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/bill-would-require-social-media-
companies-report-terrorist-activity-n476591 [https://perma.cclG4N3-3QVM]; Damian Paletta,
Congress Eyes Social-Media Companies as Terror Fears Mount; Bipartisan Bill Aims to Require
Platforms to Report Online Terrorist Activity, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2015, 8:17AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-eyes-social-media-companies-as-terror-fears-mount-
1449667043 [https://perma.cclM9W5-ZC4S].
206. See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite
Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 473 (2014) (contrasting Europe's dignity-based
theory on privacy interests with the United States' libertarian approach).
207. To reiterate, in this Essay I do not address surveillance of private data-that is a
subject for another article. Here, I am proposing a modest but urgently needed step to remove
the many readily available and searchable terror posts on social media such as YouTube,
Twitter, Snapchat, and Facebook.
208. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (finding that the First
Amendment protects abstract violent statements but not those that pose an imminent incitement
to engage in violence).
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statement can constitutionally, and should as a matter of social policy,
be made actionable, if under the circumstances it is likely to incite
such action. This would place a narrow limitation on speech without
negatively impacting any abstract statements or associational rights.
Likewise, restrictions on truly threatening speech directed at
specific persons or groups would affect only utterances that have a low
social value, without harming core self-expressive, informative, or
political statements.209 For instance, in the case of a YouTube video
calling on people to attack specific others (who may be identified by
name-as might be the case with the targeting of political leaders,
religious leaders, and so on-or by religious, political, ethnic, racial,
sex, or sexual orientation status), the government has a compelling
reason to secure public peace by limiting a very narrowly
circumscribed set of menacing digital content.
Finally, under materially supportive speech regulations, when
it comes to coordination with a group on the Secretary of State's
designated terrorist list,210 a court applying exacting scrutiny should
countenance the limited restraint on speech. The material support
category applies to persons who aid terrorist groups, post materials on
the internet, recruit others, discuss legitimate targets, or forward
terrorist materials.211 Indictments of persons who run terrorist
websites, television stations, or recruitment efforts should not be
immune from litigation, even when they are not directly involved in
the terrorist organization's violent missions.
All three parts of such a law would serve the compelling
interest of providing for security while affecting only a narrow group
of expressions with the low social value of advancing terrorist causes.
The most basic example of a statute compatible with U.S. free speech
doctrine would be a provision criminalizing social media posts,
especially those uploaded on platforms like Twitter or Facebook with
their instant messaging functions, posing an imminent threat of harm.
As with any other criminal statute, the prosecution would bear the
burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The criminal
prosecution for a truly threatening cyber post would be more complex.
The meaning of the words or symbols cannot be taken for granted;
instead, a prosecutor would need to convince the trier of fact that the
209. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (establishing that intentionally
threatening communications, such as cross burnings "carried out with the intent to intimidate,"
are not protected by the First Amendment).
210. For a discussion of the State Department's designated terrorist list, see infra text
accompanying notes 268-279.
211. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 17, 24 (2010) (developing the
constitutional framework for material support of terror prosecutions).
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words or symbols used are associated with terrorist ideology or a
terrorist organization. Threats knowingly made against the backdrop
of ISIS or Hezbollah flags could be presented as material evidence of
the defendant's frame of mind and purpose. As for material support,
under U.S. law, simple ideological, abstract, or comedic statements
lauding a designated foreign terrorist organization cannot be
prosecuted; only statements made in the service of and in coordination
with such a group are actionable.212
In addition, whether Congress adopts the omnibus or separate
statutes, the criminal provision must be narrowly tailored. To avoid
chilling core First Amendment expression and political deliberation,
the law cannot be vague. Congressional hearings and task forces
should be used to create standards that a person of average
intelligence can understand.213 As for the definition of "terrorism," the
law could either refer to existing U.S. Codes or, preferably, set forth a
unified definition to help agencies identify and combat terrorism.214
Additionally, as an initial matter, social media companies
should draft and follow their own written policies against terrorist
postings. Their terms of usage should conform to regulations that
preserve the privacy of non-offenders as well as comply with
legislative safeguards for security.215 Voluntary reporting is one facet
of the solution, but regulations should set specific and compelling
conditions as to when companies must report offending uses to
agencies and when courts may issue warrants requiring companies to
take down websites or to identify the unique internet protocol ("IP")
addresses of persons posting terrorist digital materials or of persons
posting comments planning or threatening to commit acts of terror.
Where a social media company is unwilling or unable to comply with
an injunction order-as was the case in another context, in a circuit
court copyright infringement case involving Napster, a MP3 sharing
212. For example, videos calling for the genocide of Jews in coordination with terrorist
groups should be considered actionable. For details about genocidal videos, see Pmwvideos Pmw,
Hamas Spokesmen Calls for Genocide ofAll Jews, YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2007), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=YKeAVBYAbnO&index=3&list=PL74076A6F6697D9DC [https://perma.cc/FM3B-
5W54]; Sarah levy, Mahmoud Al Zahar Reveals Hamas' Genocidal Agenda-Shocking!,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 22, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5UT6grrx8do&list=
PL74076A6F6697D9DC&index=5 [https://perma.cc/49EF-G6L9].
213. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1973) (defining unconstitutional
vagueness).
214. See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The
Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 272 (2004).
215. This Essay does not deal with social media liability, which is the subject of a separate
project.
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website216-a court should have the authority to order a partial or
complete shutdown of the system.
Even when a social media company voluntarily takes down an
offending website, it is only a temporary solution. As a cyber expert
explains, when one terrorist social media account is removed,
terrorists can simply relaunch their operations under a new
moniker.217 The European Commission warns: "[T]errorist groups
have demonstrated advanced skills in the use of the Internet and new
communication technologies to disseminate propaganda, interact with
potential recruits, share knowledge, plan and coordinate
operations."218 Voluntarily reporting the information to a cyber terror
unit, as the French and U.K. Commission schemes require,219 creates
a more centralized means of tracking repeat players across a range of
servers, social media outlets, and geographic locations. Having a
single bureaucratic entity responsible for anti-terrorist efforts on the
internet also avoids the problems associated with fragmentation, such
as confused chains of authority and balkanized data processing.
Given the magnitude of the problem, government initiative is
required. Corporate self-policing is insufficient. Legislative schemes
that rely on voluntary compliance in matters of public safety transfer
an inordinate amount of public trust into the hands of private
actors.220
Mine is not a proposal for data detection nor data mining; it
requires no breaches and no spying on private discussions (a critique
of those approaches is outside the scope of this Essay). Rather, I
suggest empowering government agencies to seek warrants, obtain
injunctions, and hold criminally accountable the creators, instigators,
and facilitators of cyber terror. It is a realistic approach designed to
combat terrorist incitement, threats, and material support without
violating First Amendment principles.
To better explain the limits of my proposal it may be helpful to
provide an example of a social media law that is far outside the
bounds of my suggestion.221 In addition to her proposal in the Senate
216. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002).
217. Solomon, supra note 202.
218. Press Release, European Commission, supra note 189.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 178-185.
220. See Carla Marinucci, Feinstein Slams Silicon Valley for Lack of Help Against Terrorist
Monsters,' POLITICO (Nov. 16, 2015, 2:24 PM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/california/
2015/11/8583030/feinstein-slams-silicon-valley-lack-help-against-terrorist-monste [https://perma
.cc[R4WB-XCQKJ.
221. An example of a politically oppressive internet security law is the new Chinese internet
security regulations. Among other provisions, the Chinese law requires companies to turn over
encryption keys and criminalizes eliciting "panic in society," influencing national policy, and
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Intelligence Committee,222 Senator Dianne Feinstein has proposed a
bill for the total ban on encrypted or public source communicationS223
that, although far less intrusive than a politically repressive internet
security law, would likely violate the prior restraint doctrine. While
the details of her plan have yet to be worked out, such a ban would
prevent the use of important communication tools, which can serve
legitimate business and private purposes as well as to obfuscate
criminality.224
Any law restricting the incitement of terrorist speech online
that functions as a prior restraint would be subject to exacting judicial
scrutiny.225 The ordinary presumption against prior restraints can be
overcome in some rare circumstances, such as those mentioned by the
influential concurrences of New York Times v. United States. While in
that case two district courts' injunctions against allowing newspapers
to publish dated military reports were found to be unconstitutional, a
majority of justices agreed that the presumption against prior
restraints can be overcome in some narrow circumstances, at least
subverting the national state-and is totalitarian in its intrusion on private communications and
political debate. See Ben Blanchard, China Passes Controversial Counter-Terrorism Law,
REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2015, 3:17 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-security-
idUKKBNOUA07820151227 [https://perma.cclG5C9-Y2XR]; Counter-Terrorism Law (Initial
Draft), CHINA LAW TRANSLATE (Nov. 8, 2014), http://chinalawtranslate.com/ctldraft/?1ang=en
[https://perma.cc/6EKP-3FFJ]. The Chinese law threatens persons simply seeking to influence
national policy through political utterances contrary to the ruling Communist Party. My
proposal is based on three Supreme Court doctrines of low value speech that poses a threat to
public safety. See supra Part II. It is not a bar against the expression of controversial nor
subversive ideas. Criminalizing terror incitement, true threats, and material support on social
media sites does not interfere with political dissent nor communicative privacy.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 192 and 205.
223. Patrick Howell O'Neill, Top Democratic Senator Will Seek Legislation to 'Pierce'
Through Encryption, DAILY DOT (Dec. 9, 2015, 10:53 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/fbi-
encryption-james-comey-tech-companies/ [https://perma.cc/U8YE-N5BH].
224. See E. John Park, Protecting the Core Values of the First Amendment in an Age of New
Technologies: Scientific Expression vs. National Security, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 10 (1997)
("[E]ncryption software is used to authorize transactions, authenticate users, verify the accuracy
of messages and documents, certify legitimate transactions, as well as protect individual
privacy."); R. Michael Waterman, The Limits of Privacy, WIS. LAW., June 2000, at 36 (book
review) ("[S]ophisticated computer encryption software allows terrorists, organized crime
members, and foreign spies to enjoy unfettered communications and operations in this
country. . . .").
225. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 766 (1994) (finding that a state
court did not violate the presumption against prior restraint by ordering a thirty-six foot buffer
zone around the entrances of an abortion clinic); Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 130 (1992) ("Although there is a 'heavy presumption' against the validity of a prior
restraint, the Court has recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of
public forums, may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or
rally." (citations omitted)); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (noting that "the
barriers to prior restraints remain high").
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when Congress has found that the threats to security are substantial
or a police action is warranted to prevent a danger that is inevitable,
direct, and immediate.226 In the matter of internet terrorist
communication, certain circumstances might pose immediate and
inevitable threats, such as if terrorists were to coordinate an ongoing
terrorist operation through Twitter, Snapchat, or Facebook Chat. This
type of event would likely warrant an emergency injunction for
suspension of specific accounts, posts, or, in the direst of
circumstances, briefly affecting even access to targeted geographic
locations. But those circumstances requiring immediate action will
likely be rare; more commonly terrorist speech on the internet is
threatening and indoctrinating.
My proposal of a criminal anti-terrorism statute addresses
perspicuous terrorist uses of the internet. But it has certain
limitations. As discussed in Part I, terrorist recruitment,
indoctrination, and operational videos are so easily found on common
websites-such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter-that besides
removing the immediately dangerous, threatening, or materially
supportive data, law enforcement agents will sometimes be unable to
track down recruiters and conspirators, unless in limited
circumstances social media servers and ISPs are enjoined to disclose
posters' and interactive users' identifying information. In addition to
U.S. domestic law, international agreements will also help law
enforcement because of the cross-border nature of terrorism; however,
new treaties or executive agreements are beyond the scope of this
Essay.
Whatever legislative scheme lawmakers adopt to restrain
terrorist expression that is not imminently dangerous, the key to
withstanding constitutional challenges will be the inclusion of
provisions limiting culpability to intentional threats and the conduct
of persons or associations that provide material support to violent
terrorist organizations. In the United States, drafting constitutional
public safety laws against terrorist utterances on the internet will
226. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[O]nly governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order."); id. at 730
(Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring) (finding that the government had failed to show
that any of the documents newspapers sought to publish posed "direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people"); id. at 732 (White, J., joined by Stewart, J.,
concurring) (discussing the value of congressional findings of a substantial threat); id. at 742-47
(Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the problem with courts granting injunctions for prior
restraint without clear congressional mandate); id. at 758 (Harlan, J., joined by Burger, C.J. &
Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 763 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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require Congress to rely on parameters of free speech doctrines. While
true threats and material support statutes will likely be the most
effective means of restricting terrorist expressions on the internet, in
some limited circumstances the Brandenburg imminent threat of
harm test could also be applicable.
Most terrorist activities on the internet do not create a clear
and present danger. However, where advocacy to terror is likely to
immediately influence violent behavior, its social value is so low as to
be outside the purview of the First Amendment.22 7 The Court has
explicitly stated that incitement is low value speech not subject to
First Amendment protection.228 There is reason to believe that in
cases where there is a grave danger to national security, the
prosecution will be able to meet the imminent threat of harm test.2 29
At a minimum, the federal government should operate emergency
courts to deal with matters like coordinated terrorist activities. This
would empower law enforcement agents to identify sources of
imminent terrorist attacks asserted on Tweets or Snapchat posts, and
immediately, albeit only temporarily, cut off internet services to the
pinpoint location of an ongoing terrorist attack or immediate
incitement. These sorts of emergency shut downs should be very brief
(between twenty-four and forty-eight hours) to preserve the right to
speech but provide law enforcement adequate time to request an
injunction or file criminal charges. Moreover, an injunction to shut
down communications should only be granted in extremely rare
circumstances where the prosecution proves that there is an ongoing
attack that is currently using social media to coordinate violence. And
even if that danger exists or is imminent, a court must balance the
government's interest of shutting down digital channels of
communication against the foreseeable need of innocent parties
trapped at the point of attack to make contact through social media.
Furthermore, the area where a digital signal is shut off should be
limited to the precise point of attack, with ongoing emergent
monitoring to track whether the location expands or shifts.
More commonly, there will be no ongoing or imminent threat
but, rather, the dissemination of true threat, indoctrination,
recruitment, and material support. In those circumstances, criminal
227. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 113-14 (2006).
228. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543-44 (2012).
229. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 251 (1961) (restating doctrine that government
can restrict both immediate and future calls for the violent overthrow of government); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497-98, 510 (1951) (upholding the conviction of Communist Party
members who allegedly advocated the violent overthrow of government).
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liability would only arise when the disseminators of terrorist content
intentionally post true threats from themselves or engage in
coordinated efforts with a terrorist group for recruitment and other
purposes. To demonstrate a compelling reason for enacting narrowly
tailored federal law against credible threats and material support,
congressional committees should elicit expert testimony in order to
identify the general characteristics of terrorist propaganda that is
intentionally uttered to endanger national security, specific
individuals, or groups. Such a record could be helpful in later
litigation.230 True threats and communicative material support for
terror constitute low value forms of speech, unprotected by the First
Amendment.231 Where national security is pitted against the
dissemination of highly dangerous menacing dogmas or radical
propaganda, government should secure public safety-which is clearly
recognized as a preeminent obligation of federal government by the
Preamble to the Constitution232-rather than succumbing to an
absolutist view of free speech.
This Essay's suggestion for a uniform national policy runs
counter to those scholars who advocate for a more state-oriented
approach of monitoring and deterring terrorist activities.233 Because
terrorism poses a substantial threat to national security, it would be a
mistake to solely rely on private companies to police themselves. So
too state-by-state approaches are likely to be insufficient to meet the
challenges of establishing interstate exchanges of police information
necessary to track a webpage that can be accessed anywhere in the
United States. A national statutory scheme is crucial for establishing
uniform standards to monitor terrorist interactions. The cross-border
nature of the internet requires national enforcement. Alexander
Hamilton long ago asserted, "The principle purposes to be answered
by Union are these-The common defence of the members-the
preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions
230. I base this argument on an indirect analogy from Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
where the Court has said that congressional hearings and formal findings are helpful, although
not mandatory, for a judge deciding whether Congress overstepped its legislative authority. See
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
231. True threats and "speech presenting some grave and imminent threat" are unprotected
by the First Amendment. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
232. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010).
233. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Counterterrorism and New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 830,
830 (2014); Benjamin S. Mishkin, Note, Filling the Oversight Gap: The Case for Local Intelligence
Oversight, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1414, 1448 (2013).
2017] 695
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
as external attacks."234 Under our system of federalism the national
government has broader reach.
Leaving regulation only to state and local officials would create
disparate (and possibly conflicting) schemes to address harms from
interstate and international digital transmissions. Moreover, a single
sovereign entity enforcing anti-terrorist incitement will find it easier
to track offenses, suspects, and IP addresses with repeated terrorist
postings than would fifty states and many more municipal bodies.235
Uniform federal law would further facilitate the establishment of
bureaucratic hierarchies for data analysis, investigation, and
prosecution. Federal law and regulations would also provide agencies
with guidance for allocating resources and relevant duties to officers
responsible for monitoring, reporting, and reacting to true threats or
material support. Congress should take legislative initiative; empower
U.S. marshals; allow for coordinated cooperation with state and local
governments; rely on a liaison agency (perhaps the Department of
Homeland Security) to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation and
dialogue; create procedures for issuing emergency and ordinary
warrants; and provide a federal forum for filing charges against
terrorist incitements, true threats, or material support on the
internet. Undoubtedly, transactional relationships between local and
federal intelligence services can facilitate efficiency and elicit
community cooperation. Yet, state and federal partnerships require
leadership from a nerve center best suited to manage interstate
operations and to coordinate with foreign governments when so
required.
Congressional authority over matters of national security
derives from the Constitution.236 Congress's power extends to the
regulation of corporations with substantial effects on the national
economy, such as the ones that provide interstate and international
234. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 146-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
Wesleyan Univ. Press 1961).
235. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 550
(1978) ("The [federal government's] prime area of concern in the licensing context ... [is]
national security, public health, and safety.").
236. I confine myself to legislative powers because the focus of this Essay limits the ability
to discuss the extensive presidential powers over foreign affairs. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
1, 2. (granting the President power "to make Treaties" and to "appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls"); Zivotofsky ex rel Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 219 (2012) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("The Executive and Legislative Branches frequently work out disagreements
through ongoing contacts and relationships . . . [which] ensure that, in practice, Members of
Congress as well as the President play an important role in the shaping of foreign policy."). The
President's authority is not absolute but subject to judicial oversight. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 700 (2001).
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internet services.237 Given the expansive scope of the internet, it is
likely that U.S. legislative initiatives will have some positive residual
effects on foreign policies. Currently, a variety of terrorist groups that
operate primarily outside the United States post messages on popular
U.S. websites. A more stringent U.S. policy against their
communications would therefore advance efforts to combat terrorism
in other countries.
My argument is not one for imposing mass surveillance; rather,
more modestly, to criminalize identifiable terrorist content without
any clandestine surveillance on social media like Twitter, Facebook,
and YouTube. This does not require any significant intrusion on
personal privacy and no xenophobic profiling; to the contrary, it
empowers law enforcement to identify speech that is currently readily
searchable on any of those web services. In addition, this Essay does
not deal with the liability of ISPs, which are typically protected by
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act against claims based on the
content of materials posted by third parties.238 That will be the subject
of a future article.239
Under the scheme outlined here, various remedies are
available against persons who post terrorist communications or
provide material support to others who post them, including ordinary
criminal liability, deportation of convicted defendants, freezing of
bank accounts, placing offenders on no fly lists, and revocation of
permanent or nonpermanent immigrant status. Even persons who
post incitements, true threats, and material supportive statements
from overseas can be held accountable through ex parte hearings after
proper notice and proof of criminality. The aim of my proposal is to
preserve pluralistic institutions against the exploitation of electronic
networks by violent associations in their efforts to spread terrorist
propaganda and recruitment.
V. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
One of the most powerful counterarguments against the
restraints I propose in this Essay comes from Professor David Cole,
who staunchly argues against government interference. Cole served as
an attorney for Humanitarian Law Project in Holder v. Humanitarian
237. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414, 424 n.14, 427 (2003) ("Congress
holds express authority to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its war and
foreign commerce powers. . . .").
238. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
239. Alexander Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
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Law Project.240 In his scholarship, he has criticized the criminalization
of "training" or "expert advice or assistance" provided to designated
foreign terrorist organizations.2 41 Cole regards restrictions of this form
of support to be a silencing of political ideas and an interference with
the right of association.242
The text of the material support statute belies Cole's claim that
it abridges the right of association.243 As we saw in Part II, the
material support statute prohibits conduct, not membership, nor is it
an abridgement on constitutionally protected speech.244 The statute's
rule of construction section prohibits the abridgement of free speech
and recognizes the judiciary's authority to interpret the law
consistently with First Amendment precedents.245  The material
support statute was enacted to deter parties from and to penalize
parties for cooperating with terrorist organizations and, thereby,
advancing or facilitating their operations. Any material support
regulation of internet terrorist speech should contain a provision
explicitly limiting its applicability to active members' intent on
violently destructive ends and those who coordinate with them.2 46
Passive membership should remain unabridged, as was the case with
the statute upheld in Humanitarian Law Project.247
Professor Cole understands the holding very differently,
writing: "For the first time in its history, the Court upheld the
240. 561 U.S. 1, 6 (2010). For an analysis of Humanitarian Law Project, see supra text
accompanying notes 116-137.
241. David Cole, The First Amendment's Borders: The Place ofHolder v. Humanitarian Law
Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 147, 151 (2012).
242. David Cole, Where Liberty Lies: Civil Society and Individual Rights After 9/11, 57
WAYNE L. REV. 1203, 1263 (2011).
243. While the First Amendment does not explicitly mention a right of association, the
Supreme Court has found it to be implicitly connected to the right of free speech. See Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981) ("[T]he right of association
[and] the right of expression . .. overlap and blend."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per
curiam) ("The Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of
association is a 'basic constitutional freedom,' that is 'closely allied to freedom of speech and a
right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.'" (citations omitted));
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966) (mentioning "the cherished freedom of association
protected by the First Amendment").
244. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 28 ("The law here may be described as directed
at conduct, as the law in Cohen was directed at breaches of the peace, but as applied to plaintiffs
the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message.").
245. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i) (2012).
246. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967).
247. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 24 ("[A]ny independent advocacy in which
plaintiffs wish to engage is not prohibited by § 2339B. On the other hand, a person of ordinary
intelligence would understand the term 'service' to cover advocacy performed in coordination
with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization.").
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criminalization of speech advocating only nonviolent, lawful ends on
the ground that such speech might unintentionally assist a third party
in criminal wrongdoing."248 Upon examination, however, Cole's claim
that Humanitarian Law Project violates free speech doctrine is
misleading. For one, parties to the case were not merely advocating
nor solely associating with like-minded people, but seeking to
strengthen the terrorist organizations' standing in international
forums, without the groups' prior renunciation of politically driven
violence. Lending assistance to a terrorist organization is an
intentional effort to increase the political standing of an illegal
organization involved in the planning and perpetration of violence.
Raising the official profile in coordination with terrorist organizations
and helping it advance its purposes is not merely an independent
endorsement.249 To meet the highly rigorous standard of proof,2 50 the
government must proffer evidence that the communication was part of
a coordinated terrorist enterprise.
Moreover, there are a variety of examples from other areas of
First Amendment jurisprudence in which the Court has found
nonviolent and even truthful expressions to be low value speech that
advances wrongdoing. For instance, criminal statutes prohibiting the
possession (just as those that prohibit production) of child
pornography are constitutional, even though obtaining the sanctioned
materials can be done without any violence, no personal abuse, no
contact with the victims, and inure no monetary benefit to the
defendant.251 Antitrust laws also prohibit certain forms of otherwise
truthful, lawful communications-limiting a person's ability to enter
into monopolistic contracts-because they interfere with commercial
dealings of third parties.252 Also constitutional are federal laws that
restrain those commercial advertisers who are licensed in states
where gambling is illegal from broadcasting advertisements into
states where gambling is legal, even though the statute regulates
248. Cole, supra note 241, at 149.
249. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39 (clarifying that the Court "in no way
suggest[s] that a regulation of independent speech would pass constitutional muster, even if the
Government were to show that such speech benefits foreign terrorist organizations").
250. In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court specifically asserted that it was applying
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and thus "more rigorous" rather than intermediate
scrutiny standard of review because of the communicative nature of Humanitarian Law Project's
proposed conduct. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27-28.
251. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1990). The Court regards child pornography to
be a historically and traditionally classified form of low value speech. United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010).
252. Stefan Grundmann, Trust and Treuhand at the End of the 20th Century. Key Problems
and Shift of Interests, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 401, 411 (1999).
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advocacy to engage in conduct that is unrelated to any violence, has no
intrinsically criminal consequences, and the transmission could
provide the public with factual information.253
Cole is undoubtedly correct that membership in a terrorist
group, without any additional effort or agency to work on its behalf,
would be protected by the First Amendment's right of association. The
Court long ago determined that membership in a nefarious
organization, even one that possesses national security risks, is
protected under the Constitution absent a defendant's engagement in
its illegality.254 Indeed, in upholding the material support statute in
Humanitarian Law Project, the Court specifically addressed Cole's
concern that the law bars group association: contrary to his
contention, the Court found the statute applies only to material
support that is coordinated with a terrorist organization.2 5 5 Criminal
liability does not attach by guilt of association but by intentional,
active involvement in the operations of a terrorist organization, albeit
in an advisory rather than violent capacity. This distinction should
guide lawmakers designing a statute to prevent terrorist
organizations from using internet servers located in the United States.
Cole discounts this critical element of the case.
Based on his incomplete reading of Humanitarian Law Project,
Cole expresses concern that an American could be held liable for
helping a foreign terrorist organization such as Hezbollah256 to win a
public election.257 We need not merely imagine the possibility of an
American working with Hezbollah; a webserver in Miami provided
that group with a platform to stream its website al-Manar.25 8 This
253. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1993) (upholding a federal
statute that prohibited the advertisement of lottery information by a radio station licensed in a
non-lottery state but whose transmission reached a state where the lottery was lawful).
However, the government cannot create a blanket prohibition against gambling advertisement in
states where that activity is lawful. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 195 (1999).
254. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) ("Mere knowing membership
without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally
adequate basis for exclusion from such positions as those held by appellants."); Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966) ("A law which applies to membership without the 'specific intent'
to further the illegal aims of the organization infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms.").
255. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 37.
256. Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP'T STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
3TGD-TDCC].
257. Cole, supra note 241, at 149.
258. Sara Carter, Feds Take Little Action Against U.S. Web Companies Hosting Sites Linked
to Terror, WASH. TIMES (May 15, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/15/
feds-take-little-action-against-us-web-companies-h/ [https://perma.cc/28HJ-99S3]. Another
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does indeed appear to be cooperative, material support for advancing
terrorist indoctrination and recruitment. On the other hand, speech
delivered in favor of the group's ideology is protected by the
Constitution, but working with it to gain the reins of international or
domestic government is not. Cole apparently regards terrorist
politicking to be protected by the First Amendment in the same way
as democratic self-determination. As then Solicitor General and later
Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan put it at oral arguments to
Humanitarian Law Project, "Hezbollah builds bombs. Hezbollah also
builds homes. What Congress decided was when you help Hezbollah
build homes, you are also helping Hezbollah build bombs."25 9
The Supreme Court made clear that the material support
statute is unrelated to the suppression of pure political speech.
Indeed, neither a prohibition against true threats nor against material
support of terrorist organizations targets the discussion nor
dissemination of public opinions. Terrorist organizations take up
legitimate political methods to advance extremist political agendas.
They often form political bureaucracies separate from their political
wings. This enables their leaders to seek alternative strategies for
achieving gains, while simultaneously continuing to plan and
perpetrate ideologically driven acts of violence.260 Hezbollah's violent
threats are outside the purview of First Amendment political speech
protection, even though the group demonstrated electorate strength by
winning seats in the Lebanese Parliament.
The limited social value of terrorist speech, for such things as
information acquisition or self-expression, is outweighed by the public
interest to preserve safety and order. Courts have repeatedly found
incitement, true threats, and material support laws to target
unprotected, low value speech that can be restricted because of the
substantial, and probably even compelling, aim of maintaining public
safety. This history and tradition applies especially to cases involving
website, streamed from a New Jersey internet server, hosts an al-Qaeda affiliated website that
teaches how to build and use explosive devices. Id.
259. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Weighs Free Speech Against Aid to Terrorists, WASH.
POST (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/23/
AR2010022304877.html [https://perma.cc/75ZQ-J3SE].
260. White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T. STATE 2001-
2009 ARCHIVE (Sept. 2006), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/whI71803.htm [https://perma
.cclU4FE-3KTG] (asserting that terrorists "exploit Islam to serve a violent political vision," while
they "deny all political and religious freedoms and serve as sanctuaries for extremists to launch
additional attacks against not only the United States, its allies and partners, but the Muslim
world itself"); see also LEONARD WEINBERG & AMI PEDAHZUR, POLITICAL PARTIES AND TERRORIST
GROUPS 61-86 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing how some terrorist organizations form political arms,
even as they continue perpetrating violence, while others renounce violence altogether).
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a terrorist group with a long history of political violence; such as is the
case with Hezbollah, which is responsible for the systematic murder of
one thousand Americans and many foreign nationals.261 Preventing
Hezbollah or anyone working with it to exploit social media for the
advancement of its murderous political agenda would be compelling
for putting an end to the organization's mass criminality.262 Cole's
hyperbolic claim that a person can break the material support law by
calling for the delisting of certain groups from the State Department's
terrorist group list seems off-base, unless such lobbying is specifically
coordinated with a terrorist organization.263 Simply verbally
supporting a group or even nominally being a member to make a
statement without doing anything to support its organization, is
protected by the First Amendment.264 However, where a member
begins to advance a terrorist cause, directly or indirectly (either by
direct incitement or true threats on social media, training terrorists in
the use of that media, or uploading such material on those websites),
the actions give rise to probable cause of material support.
Another opponent of stringent control of terrorist speech is
Professor Wadie Said, who raises concerns closely related to Cole's
about the constitutionality of the material support statute. Said
downplays the threats posed by terror indoctrination. He writes that
laws prohibiting support of foreign terrorist organizations stigmatize
speakers and remove "First Amendment protections to the point
where mere speech on behalf of a group runs afoul" of the statute.265
This statement, however, contradicts Said's admission that
"technically one can still legally be a member of such a group,
261. Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, H.R. 2297, 114th Cong.
(2015); Terrorist Groups, Hizballah, NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR. https://www.nctc.gov/site/
groups/hizballah.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7MZV-EB67].
262. Cole's claim that Jimmy Carter actually met with Hezbollah in preparation for the
2009 Lebanese election seems fallacious. The statement does not appear in the article to which
Cole cites. Joshua Hersh, Jimmy Carter Visits Lebanon, NEW YORKER (Jun. 10, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/jimmy-carter-visits-lebanon [https://perma.cc[R8V2-
TNFZ]. Indeed, in 2008 and again in 2009 Hezbollah expressly rejected meeting Carter, arguing
that it would have been counterproductive. Hussein Dakroub, Jimmy Carter Regrets Not Meeting
with Hezbollah, WORLD POST (Dec. 12, 2008, 5:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-
wires/20081212/ml-lebanon-us-carter/ [https://perma.cc/M265-YU2T]; US Stand Has Not
Changed Under Obama-Lebanese Hezbollah Deputy Chief, BBC MONITORING MIDDLE EAST
(Oct. 16, 2009), http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.vanderbilt.eduldoview/458595474?
accountid=14816&rfrid=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo [https://perma.cc/43VX-MTQ8].
263. Cole, supra note 241, at 149.
264. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (overturning Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 359 (1927), an earlier decision that held constitutional a statute that criminalized
membership in a criminal syndicate).
265. Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court's Construction of
Terrorism, BYU L. REV. 1455, 1508 (2011).
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[however,] virtually any action on its behalf, such as paying
membership dues, violates the law."2 6 6 He, thereby, concedes that
statements of support alone would not be enough for liability; it is only
when one's actions are done in concert with the terrorist organization
that he or she becomes subject to criminal conviction. Said, like Cole,
discounts the cooperation component of material support that makes
otherwise protected speech actionable, claiming instead that the
statute bans "pure speech."267
In addition, Said argues that the Court's deference in
Humanitarian Law Project to the State Department's list of
designated terrorist organizations grants the Executive Branch
"seemingly limitless" authority to define "what constitutes terrorist
activity." 268 A problem with a material support statute, as Said sees it,
is that it threatens to label as a foreign terrorist any "nonstate actor"
who commits an act of "political violence."269 Professors Cole and Jules
Lobel also express the concern that the Court's unwillingness to
second-guess the State Department's prerogative to designate who are
foreign terrorist organizations amounts to "black-list[ing] foreign
groups and prosecut[ing] their domestic supporters."270
Their concerns no doubt arise from sincere desires to prevent
presidential overreaching. But they offer no alternative to the
Executive following sufficiently robust procedures to identifying
groups dangerous to national security. The process used to designate a
group may be challenged for being arbitrary and capricious, but courts
exhibit deference for the actual State Department list. A group can
only be designated a foreign terrorist organization after the Secretary
of State, with the consultation of the Attorney General and Secretary
of the Treasury, follows extensive procedures to add it.271 An
organization that engages in terrorist activities is statutorily defined
to engage in conduct such as hijacking of vehicles; seizing and
detaining persons to murder, maim, and otherwise injure to compel
actions by a third person; intentionally attacking an internationally
protected person; engaging in assassination; using biological,
chemical, or nuclear agents; and similar misconduct.272 These
266. Id. at 1507.
267. Wadie E. Said, Sentencing Terrorist Crimes, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 477, 505 (2014).
268. Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543,
571 (2011).
269. Id. at 570.
270. DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR
ON TERROR 54 (2007).
271. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a), (d)(4) (2016).
272. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
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examples for designation are carefully spelled out by law to avoid
arbitrary classification.
Despite the need for deference in matters of national security,
courts can demand that prosecutors proffer evidence that the group
designation has not been made arbitrarily. While secrecy might be
necessary in the selection of designated terrorist groups, a court could
nevertheless demand prosecutors bringing suits to provide judges with
in camera evidence sufficient to meet the strict scrutiny burden of
proof.273
As for singling out certain groups rather than including all
terrorist organizations in the world on the list, the Supreme Court has
found that in order to prevent persons from supporting terrorist
organizations, Congress can harness expertise to determine that some
groups are "particularly dangerous and lawless foreign organizations,"
without having to ban support to all foreign organizations.2 74 The
Secretary of State has designated groups after extensive evidence
gathering of nefarious conduct, such as killing and bombing.275 Before
groups are put on the list, the Secretary must provide them with
notice of the planned action, without granting unauthorized parties
access to confidential information, and offer them the opportunity to
rebut the findings.276 The statute authorizing the Secretary of State to
designate certain groups as foreign terrorist organizations is not an
overextension of power, as Said, Cole, and Lobel purport, but only
authorizes the Executive to provide for the "national defense, foreign
relations, or economic interests."277 Indeed a close examination of the
federal regulation naming the designated terrorist organizations
demonstrates a variety of violent foreign non-state organizations,
rather than an arbitrary group.278
Courts that have reviewed the State Department designation
procedures have found that, "[g]iven the stringent requirements that
must be met before a group is designated a foreign terrorist
273. Professor Eric Berger has made a similar point about the use of in camera hearings in
material support of terror prosecutions. Berger, supra note 133, at 515-16.
274. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010).
275. See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 24-25 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
276. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
277. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C), (d)(2).
278. Among the terrorist organizations on the State Department list are the Abu Nidal
Organization, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hamas, Khmer Rouge, Kach,
National Liberation Army, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others that instigate indiscriminate
attacks on civilians for political purposes. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62
Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650-01 (Oct. 8, 1997).
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organization, Congress carefully limited its prohibition on funding as
narrowly as possible in order to achieve the government's interest in
preventing terrorism."279 Such a government effort is not merely
discretionary but imperative. Prohibiting the material support of
terror, on the internet and otherwise, is not a First Amendment
violation but a restriction on conduct that would provide succor on
behalf of a foreign terrorist organization.280
Professor Aziz Huq, another critic of Humanitarian Law
Project and its reasoning, argues that the Court was inconsistent in
rejecting a constitutional challenge to the material support statute in
that case, while in another decision, Citizens United v. Federal
Elections Commission,281 finding unconstitutional a federal restriction
on corporate campaign financing.282 Huq claims that, although those
two cases dealt with different subjects, both of the challenged
statutes-the Material Support for Foreign Terrorist Organization
Statute283 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act284-bore a
striking similarity in so far as they severally inhibited the political
marketplace of ideas.285 According to him, courts should conduct strict
scrutiny review, whether they are confronted with facial challenges to
statutes that prohibit succor to known terrorists or that limit
corporate political participation in elective politics.
Huq's claim of parity between political advice to foreign
terrorist organizations and corporate political expenditures ignores
the distinction between speech subversive to egalitarian order and
that supportive of candidates running for public office. This key
difference between the two is especially clear when national security is
at stake because one of the core purposes for the exercise of
government is the advancement of public safety and common
279. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1027 (7th Cir. 2002).
280. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 328-29 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated on other
grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), reinstated in relevant part, 405 F.3d 1034 (4th Cir. 2005).
281. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
282. See Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 16 (2012).
283. The statute's definition of "material support or resources" includes "property, tangible
or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel . .. and transportation, except medicine or religious materials . . . ." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b)(1) (2006).
284. 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2016) (formerly cited as 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
285. Huq, supra note 282, at 22 (arguing that suppressing speech coordinated with foreign
terrorist organization distorts the political marketplace of ideas).
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defense.286 Giving inadequate thought to those central public
imperatives, Huq's analysis elevates advisory support of designated
foreign terrorists, aimed at helping them become savvy at gaining
credibility and influence through international politics, with corporate
expenditures for candidates seeking to gain political office.
It would appear that to Huq's mind a criminal statute
prohibiting material support of terrorists is analogous to one
regulating political campaign financing.287 Although Huq does not
mention it, his argument is compatible with Justice Holmes's
statement that popular will should be given its reign, even if its
demagoguery leads to the establishment of "proletarian
dictatorship."288 This argument regards free speech to be of a higher
constitutional value than equal safety for the political community,
preferring liberty over security against militant threats.
While bearing some resemblance to Holmes's Social
Darwinism, Huq's view differs profoundly from the views of Justices
Jackson and Goldberg that the Constitution is not a suicide pact.289
Taken to its reduction ad absurdum, Huq's position would equate the
material and coordinated support of foreign terrorist organizations,
who are committed to the destruction of pluralistic governments, with
company expenditures on democratic elections. Huq equivocates the
value of terrorist support, albeit through nonviolent advice for the
advancement of terrorist organizations in international forums (be
they at the United Nations or on the internet), to the constitutional
level typically reserved for legitimate political discourse and self-
affirmation.290  Entirely ignored by his essay are terrorist
organizations' persistent uses of fighting words and true threats-both
286. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010) ("The Preamble to the
Constitution proclaims that the people of the United States ordained and established that
charter of government in part to 'provide for the common defence.' ").
287. Huq, supra note 282, at 17 ("These lines of precedent are more alike, I will argue, than
first appearances suggest. Both can be colorably read to involve state efforts to regulate the
national political marketplace. Both also implicate a compelling government interest in
preserving democracy, albeit from distinct internal and external threats.").
288. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If in the long
run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their
chance and have their way.").
289. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
290. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 403 (1992) (White, J., concurring)
("By placing fighting words, which the Court has long held to be valueless, on at least equal
constitutional footing with political discourse and other forms of speech that we have deemed to
have the greatest social value, the majority devalues the latter category."); id. at 422 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing against the mistaken notion that "fighting words and obscenity receive the
same sort of protection afforded core political speech").
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forms of speech the Court has long recognized to be unprotected by the
First Amendment291-on a parallel track with the use of instructions
from organizations like Humanitarian Law Project about how to
ingratiate political offshoots of terrorist organizations with legitimate
echelons of government and international order.292
Other authors address the protection of terrorist speech from a
different perspective. Some, for instance, believe that courts should
unfailingly adhere to the Brandenburg standard; according to this
perspective, only imminently harmful terrorist speech is subject to
censure.293 But this perspective lacks the nuance to distinguish speech
made at a private meeting, attended by a few Ku Klux Klan members
in that case, and the national-indeed the global-reach of internet
terrorist advocacy. The Brandenburg-based argument against the
regulation of terrorist advocacy lacks contextual nuance of the multi-
valent dangers involved. It further ignores two critically important
strands of judicial thought, the true threats and material support
doctrines, neither of which requires government to prove imminence of
criminality. A federal law against terrorist incitement, true threats,
and material support is the most robust way to address the threat of
terrorist propaganda on social media while staying true to free speech
doctrine.
291. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (holding that a Virginia statute banning
cross burning with intent to intimidate did not violate the free speech clause of the First
Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding the prevention of
and punishment for "fighting words" to be constitutional).
292. Among the groups that have successfully exploited elections to gain political power
while maintaining their authoritarian and violent practices are Hamas in the Gaza Strip,
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Islamic Salvation Front and Armed Islamic Group in Algeria. See
ARTICLE 19, THE RIGHT TO KNow: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
INFORMATION 99 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1995); BENEDETTA BERTI, ARMED POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS: FROM CONFLICT TO INTEGRATION 77-78 (2013); CINDY R. JEBB ET AL., THE
FIGHT FOR LEGITIMACY: DEMOCRACY VS. TERRORISM 125-26 (2006) (discussing Hamas's use of
the political process to gain power while maintaining its right to violently attack civilian
targets); MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM IN THE SERVICE OF JIHAD
(2006); ZONES OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA: THEORIES AND CASES 44 (George Klay Kieh, Jr. & Ida
Rousseau Mukenge eds., 2002); Jonathan Masters & Zachary Laub, Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah,
Hizbu'llah), COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-
hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155 [https://perma.cc/K79C-DAR6].
293. See, e.g., Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
1667, 1685 (2015); Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
655, 712 (2009); Elisa Kantor, Note, New Threats, Old Problems: Adhering to Brandenburg's




The internet has become a tool for fomenting and inspiring acts
of terrorism. YouTube videos, Facebook pages, and tweets directly call
on listeners to commit ideologically driven, violent crimes. Despite his
death in 2011, al-Awlaki's sermons, articles, and videos continue to
circulate on the internet and inspire new acts of terrorism.294 More
recently ISIS's presence on the internet has helped its recruitment,
planning, and operations.295 Violent advocacy through social media
poses a challenge to the Brandenburg test for incitement.
Brandenburg's stringent intent, imminence, and likelihood
requirements have complicated efforts to proscribe terrorist speech on
the internet. In addition to the incitement doctrine, Supreme Court
precedents establish two alternatives for formulating statutory
strategies to confront the effects of terrorist communications through
social media. True threats and material support of terrorist websites,
chatrooms, blogs, sermons, YouTube postings, and similar digital
content pose dangers to national security that the federal government
is best equipped to confront.
Any law restricting the use of terrorist ideology on the internet
must abide by constitutional standards. A narrowly tailored, multi-
pronged law should be grounded on permissible restrictions against
incitement, material support for terror, and true threats. These three
separate doctrines can be used to stem the growing volume of terrorist
recruitment, indoctrination, incitement, and coordination available on
social media. Anti-terrorist efforts on the internet should be
undertaken at the federal level, providing a prominent role for judicial
oversight to issue warrants and injunctions. This proposal balances
the public interest in deterring and punishing interstate threats,
while remaining vigilant against abuses to free speech and
associational rights.
294. See Shane, supra note 29.
295. See Ellen Nakashima, At Least 60 People Charged with Terrorism-Linked Crimes This
Year-A Record, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/at-least-60-people-charged-with-terrorism-linked-crimes-this-year--a-record/2015/12/25/
Oaa8acda-ab42 -1 1e5-8058-480b572b4aaestory.html?hpid=hphp-top-table-main is scases-
410pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm-term=.ffb6b347e74c [https://perma.cc/6AKB-ULCL].
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